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COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE EFFECT
OF CHILD ABUSE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
IN THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS
Jane Rutherford*
INTRODUCTION
The Biblical admonition that the sins of the fathers will be passed
on to subsequent generations' can be interpreted to mean that parents
may set bad examples for their children, who then replicate their be-
havior. It can also be interpreted to mean that wrongful behavior is
passed down through a more direct form of inheritance, such as
bloodline. Recent research in behavioral genetics has suggested that a
combination of inherited characteristics and exposure to violent ex-
amples may contribute to inappropriate aggression.
The impact of this scholarship will depend in large part on how it is
interpreted in light of the different theories of juvenile justice. Five of
these theories will be discussed below. But regardless of one's theo-
retical approach, recent findings of behavioral genetics imply an im-
perative need for society and the courts to shield juveniles from the
effects of child abuse and domestic violence, as well as a need to pro-
vide appropriate mental health treatment to juvenile offenders.
II. FIVE MODELS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
At least five different models of juvenile justice exist today: (1) pu-
nitive, (2) rehabilitative, (3) assimilative, (4) restorative, and (5) pre-
ventive. Although most juvenile courts combine aspects of more than
one model, it helps to analyze each approach separately for clarity.
The way that courts will respond to emerging issues in behavioral ge-
netics may depend on the philosophy they favor.
A. Punitive Model
The punitive model best describes the current system. This is the
established criminal approach for both juveniles and adults, and its
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; Director, Schiller DuCanto and Fleck
Family Law Center, DePaul University.
1. Exodus 20:5; Deuteronomy 5:9.
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main goals are punishment and deterrence. It essentially divides
juveniles into two groups: good kids and bad kids. Good kids do not
get into trouble. Bad kids, on the other hand, simply need to be
punished.
1. Spare the Rod, Spoil the Child2
Originally influenced by strong Calvinist doctrine that saw God's
grace as immutable,3 the punitive approach seeks to punish sinful be-
havior: "To beat the devil out of the boy."' 4 Scientifically, the punitive
model appears most influenced by social Darwinism and eugenics.
Bad boys and girls cannot be helped or changed; they need to be pun-
ished severely to deter them from following their evil instincts.
The early influence of both Calvinism and social Darwinism, includ-
ing their emphasis on inherent defects, leaves the punitive approach
susceptible to conscious and unconscious bias. This bias often targets
certain groups in the population, which are defined by phenotypic
traits such as race, gender, and ethnicity. Furthermore, initial percep-
tions of who is a "bad kid" are reinforced by a system that emphasizes
the continuing nature of deviancy. 5 Once a child gets into trouble for
the first time and is labeled a "delinquent," he is much more likely to
be viewed as incorrigible, particularly if he belongs to an already
marginalized group. Finally, those who live in "tough" neighborhoods
are far more likely to have contact with the police, and a stepped set
of legal rules increases the severity of the outcome with each contact.
Consequently, African-American and Latino youths are dispropor-
tionately arrested, charged, detained, and incarcerated when com-
pared to white adolescents with similar records accused of similar
crimes. 6
2. See Proverbs 23:13.
3. See, e.g., David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations
of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1197-98 (1998).
4. See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, Capitalizing Adolescence: Juvenile Offenders on Death Row, 59
U. MIAMI L. REV. 135, 159 (2005) (noting that in colonial times "the preferred method of deal-
ing with children's crimes was for their parents to 'beat the devil' out of them").
5. See Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conserva-
tive "Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1571 (2003) (noting the cumulative decisions made at
intake, petition, detention, adjudication, and disposition).
6. See Howard N. Snyder, Juvenile Arrests 2000, Juv. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2002, at 10, available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/191729.pdf (noting that in 2000 the arrest rate for black juveniles
was nearly four times the rate for white juveniles); see also BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 180, 217, 231, 256, 264 (1999); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Youthful Indiscretions: Culture, Class Status and the Passage to Adulthood,
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 757 (2002) ("A number of studies report that minority or lower-class
youths receive more severe dispositions than [Wlhite youths even after controlling for relevant
950 [Vol. 56:949
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The numbers are even more dramatic for those transferred to adult
court. Thus, although black juveniles account for only 26% of youths
arrested, they are 46% of those waived to adult criminal court.7 These
disparities cannot be explained by the nature of the offenses commit-
ted. For instance, African-American juveniles are forty-eight times
more likely to be incarcerated for drug offenses than white juveniles.8
For violent crimes, white youths serve the shortest sentences (193
days), blacks serve almost 24% longer (254 days), and undifferenti-
ated Hispanics serve the longest (305 days, or 37% longer than
whites). 9
Behavioral genetics may be misinterpreted to aggravate these racial
disparities, especially if the science is read as reinforcing biological
determinism. The risk is that those applying the law may either con-
sciously or unconsciously misapply genetic evidence to reinforce a
long tradition that seeks to punish those viewed as suspect outsiders.
The punitive model views the children in the justice system as
criminals, and accordingly, a punitive government should enforce the
law and root out such criminals. Any attempt to explain or mitigate a
juvenile's behavior based on the child's developmental limitations or
experiences is often belittled with derogatory labels like "abuse ex-
cuse"10 or "coddling."'1
The only real issue before a punitive court is culpability. Did the
accused child commit the crime and was he morally culpable for it?
Once culpability is determined, the punitive model uses legal tools
like imprisonment, zero tolerance policies, and waivers to adult court
legal variables." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barry C.
Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Differ-
ence It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 884 (1988))); Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld,
The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
449, 464 (1996) ("Although about one-third (34%) of the arrests for violent crimes involved
white juveniles, less than one-fifth (19%) of the violent offenders against whom prosecutors filed
reference motions were white.").
7. Fox Butterfield, Racial Disparities Seen as Pervasive in Juvenile Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2000, at Al.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOW1Tz, THE ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER CoP-OUTs, SOB STO-
RIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 45-47 (1994); JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT:
DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997); Kenneth B. Noble, Menen-
dez Brothers Convicted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996, § 4, at 2 ("A California jury . .. convicted
Lyle and Erik Menendez of murdering their parents, rejecting their claim that years of sexual
and emotional abuse, not greed, had compelled them to commit the crime.").
11. See, e.g., Elsa Brenner, The New Debate on Penalties for Juvenile Offenders, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 1996, § 13 (Westchester Wkly.), at 1 (quoting Westchester County District Attorney
Jeanine Pirro, "For too long, we have been coddling young offenders .... We have been reluc-
tant to treat them as adults.").
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to deter crime. For example, a court recently followed the punitive
model when it sentenced a twelve-year-old boy to thirty years in
prison for killing his grandparents, despite well-documented evidence
of preexisting mental illness. 12 The child was held accountable for his
behavior regardless of its cause.
2. Culpability and Brain Development
The punitive approach, particularly its focus on culpability, is com-
ing under attack as a result of new neuroscientific findings that
demonstrate that adolescent brains are significantly undeveloped in
comparison to adult brains.13 Specifically, these findings indicate that
the prefrontal lobe does not fully develop until at least the mid-twen-
ties, which is significant because the prefrontal lobe is responsible for
controlling impulses, regulating emotions generated by the amygdala
deep in the brain, and processing consequences. 14 In essence, this part
of the brain acts like the brakes on a car, slowing down emotional
processes in order to assess the wisdom of a particular action. Be-
cause the prefrontal lobe develops gradually, it does not simply turn
on or off at a particular age.
To the extent that the prefrontal lobe operates like the brakes on a
car, most adolescents drive cars with very thin brake shoes. The effec-
tiveness of such weak brakes depends on how fast the car is going and
how suddenly the car needs to stop. Because of the decreased ability
to slow emotional processes, a teen's ability to resist impulses is highly
dependent on the circumstances. When teens feel threatened or are
among their peers, the car goes fast: their emotions soar, and they are
less capable of resisting their impulses.
Such impulsiveness may be aggravated by a child's previous history.
In order to be adaptable to changed circumstances, the brain is plastic,
changing both its biochemistry and even its anatomy in response to
the environment.1 5 The more often an individual is exposed to stress-
ful environments, including "bad neighborhoods, bad homes, and bad
12. See Bruce Smith, Jurors Reject Zoloft Defense in Teen's Murder Case, CINCINNATI POST,
Feb. 16, 2005, at A2. The defense was claiming Zoloft caused the aggression, but it was uncon-
tested that the child was seriously depressed. There is strong evidence of a correlation between
depression and aggression in youth. See Stephen C. Messer & Alan M. Gross, Childhood De-
pression and Aggression: A Covariance Structure Analysis, 32 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 663, 663
(1994).
13. See, e.g., B.J. Casey et al., Imaging the Developing Brain: What Have We Learned About
Cognitive Development?, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 104 (2005) (reviewing literature on changes
in the brain from childhood to late adolescence).
14. See infra note 59.
15. DEBRA NIEHOFF, THE BIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE: How UNDERSTANDING THE BRAIN, BE-
HAVIOR, AND ENVIRONMENT CAN BREAK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF AGGRESSION 182-87 (1999).
[Vol. 56:949
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relationships," the more quickly the brain responds to such situa-
tions.16 This information helps explain the inconsistencies in teen be-
havior. The immature prefrontal lobe does not adequately modulate
the strong emotions stirred up by adolescent hormones, so most teens
are subject to wide mood swings. Since the brakes on the car do not
work well, it is always going either too quickly or too slowly, and the
adolescent is unable to adequately control his moods and impulses. If
teens have had relatively little experience with violence, they are less
likely to read social cues as threatening. As a result, they put less
stress on their prefrontal lobe and are more likely to be able to resist
inappropriate impulses. But teens exposed to violence or subject to
strong peer pressure experience more stress. This stress places addi-
tional strain on the immature prefrontal lobe, making violent impulses
difficult, if not impossible, to resist.
These scientific findings about the anatomical and biochemical dif-
ferences in adolescent brains have had a large impact on the law and
its focus on culpability. Recently, the Supreme Court cited research in
this area when it invalidated the juvenile death penalty in Roper v.
Simmons.1 7 The Court noted that teens' diminished impulse control
and limited ability to process the consequences of their actions render
them less culpable.' 8 The Court held that teens are less culpable for
three basic reasons: (1) they are immature and, consequently, less in
control of their impulses; (2) they are more powerfully influenced by
others, especially peers;19 and (3) they have not fully developed their
character yet, so they are likely to change considerably.20 The Court
also cited this research as evidence that there was greater hope for
treatment and growth that would transform juvenile offenders into
lawful citizens in adulthood. 21 Consequently, the Court held that the
death penalty amounts to cruel and unusual punishment for acts com-
mitted while a juvenile.22
The Court's opinion in Roper was foreshadowed by Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, which invalidated the death penalty for mentally retarded
adults.2 3 In Atkins, as in Roper, the Court found that it was cruel and
16. Id. at 185-86.
17. 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
18. Id. at 570 ("The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means
'their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult."' (quoting
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988))).
19. Id. at 569.
20. Id. at 570.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 568.
23. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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unusual to punish an individual for behavior he could not understand
or control. 24 Read together, Atkins and Roper may undermine a puni-
tive approach to juveniles and genetically disadvantaged individuals.
The Court in Roper reinforced this notion when it referred to the
chance for juveniles to reform. 25 One of the questions that emerges
from Roper is whether juveniles now have a constitutional right to
treatment if they are detained, since it might be cruel and unusual to
deny them the opportunity to escape future punishment. Even if
there is no specific right for a minor to receive treatment, a broad
reading of Roper might constitutionally require states to adopt a reha-
bilitative model of juvenile justice.
B. Rehabilitative Model
In contrast to the punitive approach, the rehabilitative model fo-
cuses on treatment rather than punishment.26 An outgrowth of the
Progressive Movement at the turn of the twentieth century, the reha-
bilitative model finds the source of juvenile crime in the environment
rather than within the individual child. This model focuses on bad
parenting and toxic culture as the causes of deviance.
1. "There's No Such Thing as a Bad Boy" 27
Strongly influenced by psychoanalysis, behavioral psychology, and
child development theories, the rehabilitative model seeks to improve
disadvantaged children by creating a better environment for them.
The basic premise of this approach is that given the "right" upbring-
ing, education, and treatment, any child can become a productive citi-
zen. Implicit in this theory, however, is the notion that certain
culturally defined groups have failed their children. Generally, re-
24. See id. at 317-20 (discussing why mental retardation renders defendants less culpable for
their behavior, and how that undermines the retribution justification for the death penalty).
25. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (noting that "a greater possibility exists that a minor's character
deficiencies will be reformed").
26. For further accounts of the rehabilitative model, see FELD, supra note 6, at 60-63 and
Amy M. Thorson, Note, From Parens Patriae to Crime Control: A Comparison of the History
and Effectiveness of the Juvenile Justice Systems in the United States and Canada, 16 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 845, 845 & n.1, 846-47 (1999).
27. Boys TowN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) 1938) (spoken by Father Flanagan).
[Vol. 56:949
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formers have focused on outsiders-including immigrants,28 people of
color, 29 and the poor30-as bad parents.
Under the rehabilitative theory, the government should exercise its
parens patriae powers to act as a beneficent parent. In essence, the
role of the rehabilitative juvenile court is to oversee the therapy nec-
essary to repair the bad parenting that led the child to err. The legal
tools available to accomplish this goal include various treatment ther-
apies, foster placement, and the use of juvenile as opposed to adult
courts. At one time, nearly all the states embraced the rehabilitative
model and reflected it in their juvenile court acts. 31 Many continue to
include rehabilitative goals in their current statutes. 32 For example, a
Florida newspaper recently reported that a juvenile court would prob-
ably send a fourteen-year-old boy to a residential treatment facility
for killing his friend during an argument following a game they had
been playing. 33 If the court had applied the adult punitive standard
rather than focused on rehabilitative goals, the boy would have been
incarcerated for thirty years to life.34
28. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 6, at 63-64 ("[T]he juvenile court reformers were ... sending
numerous missionaries from the dominant culture to the lower classes to acculturate immigrants,
to teach mothers household management, and to supervise the recipients of charity." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVE-
NILE COURT EXPERIMENT 47 (1978))); Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers Should Be Lawyers, but
What Does That Mean?: A Response to Aiken & Wizner and Smith, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y
49, 89 (2004) (noting that "the history of the juvenile court provides support for the argument
that underlying the benevolence of the juvenile court reform was a desire for social control of
the 'deviant' immigrant classes by members of the social elite").
29. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II: Race and the
"Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 340-50 (1999) (describing the changes
that took place in the 1960s in response to African-American migration into the cities and white
migration out to the suburbs).
30. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRA-
TION 2 (2000) (noting that juvenile courts were described as rehabilitative although there is some
question "[w]hether their movement was in fact a humanitarian one to save poor and immigrant
children or intended to extend social control over them").
31. See, e.g., FRANCIS BARRY MCCARTHY ET AL., JUVENILE LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 59-61 (3d ed. 2003) ("The Illinois Act served as a model for legislation in other
states. By 1928, all but two states, Maine and Wyoming, had adopted juvenile court systems.").
32. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-101(1)(c) (West 2004) ("To provide an individu-
alized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile, in order to rehabilitate
and to prevent further delinquent behavior through the development of competency in the juve-
nile offender.").
33. See Missy Stoddard, 14-Year-Old Guilty in Shooting Death: Boy's Plea Deal Likely Will
Result in Sentence to Treatment Center, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), July 24, 2004, at
B3 ("Since he was adjudicated as a juvenile, the teen likely will be sentenced to a residential
treatment facility.").
34. Id.
2007]
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2. Amenability to Treatment
Recall that the crucial issue for the punitive model is whether mi-
nors with immature brains are fully culpable for their crimes. In con-
trast, the crucial issue for courts applying the rehabilitative model is
whether juvenile offenders are amenable to treatment. 35
The Court in Roper noted that juveniles are more likely than adults
to be rehabilitated. 36 In fact, most juveniles grow out of their delin-
quent ways without any intervention at all.37 As Professor Franklin
Zimring expresses it, "[T]he cure for youth crime is growing up."' 38
Although most adolescent males have committed one or more
crimes,39 most of them will mature into responsible, law-abiding
adults. This pattern is not surprising given the plasticity of the brain
and the normal development of the prefrontal lobe that occurs in the
early- to mid-twenties.
Nevertheless, about 5% of juvenile offenders will continue on their
path of crime and become life-long criminals.40 Some of these
juveniles have more serious problems than a simple immaturity of the
prefrontal lobe. They may suffer from depression or anxiety, or they
may have conduct disorders. They may have been victims of physical
or sexual abuse, or they may have been traumatized by other violence
35. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and Reconstruct-
ing the Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299 (1999) (arguing
that a juvenile should be transferred to adult court only when it is impossible to treat him in the
juvenile system).
36. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) ("[A] greater probability exists that a minor's
character deficiencies will be reformed.").
37. See, e.g., Mark A. Small, Juvenile Law and Genetics, in GENETICS AND CRIMINALITY: THE
POTENTIAL MISUSE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION IN COURT 199, 205 (Jeffrey R. Botkin et al.
eds., 1999) ("One of the most well-known findings in criminal justice is the age-crime curve; the
consistent finding that the age of offense typically peaks in the late teenage years and signifi-
cantly declines as age advances."); Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young
Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL:
A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 271, 283 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G.
Schwartz eds., 2000) ("The theory is that the high prevalence of offense behavior in the teen
years and the rather high rates of incidence for those who offend are transitory phenomena
associated with a transitional status and life period." (citing Delbert S. Elliott, Serious Violent
Offenders: Onset, Developmental Course, and Termination-The American Society of Criminol-
ogy 1993 Presidential Address, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1994))).
38. Zimring, supra note 37, at 284.
39. See Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior:
A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 687 (1993) ("[N]ear adolescence, a few
boys join the [lifelong criminals], then a few more, until a critical mass is reached when almost all
adolescents are involved in some delinquency with age peers."); id. at 689 ("Data from epidemi-
ological studies using the self-report method suggest that almost all adolescents do commit some
illegal acts.").
40. William Halikias, Forensic Evaluations of Adolescents: Psychosocial and Clinical Consid-
erations, 35 ADOLESCENCE 467, 471-72 (2000).
[Vol. 56:949
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in their lives. Some may have genetic variants that result in low levels
of the brain enzyme monoamine oxase A (MAOA), a deficiency that
may incline juveniles toward violent behavior. 41 Individuals subject to
these conditions may need treatment to counteract them and help
stave off a life of crime.
Therefore, for courts that follow the rehabilitative model, a key le-
gal issue in determining whether juvenile court is the appropriate
venue for a minor is whether that minor is amenable to treatment.
Scholars such as Christopher Slobogin argue that this should be the
only consideration in deciding whether the juvenile court should re-
tain jurisdiction or transfer the juvenile to adult court.42 As a result,
they are very critical of statutes that automatically transfer juveniles
to adult court based on age and the severity of the offense.43 These
scholars believe that the nature of the crime committed has nothing to
do with whether treatment may be successful.
Amenability to treatment, however, is vague and difficult to estab-
lish for at least two reasons. First, the complex interaction of genetics,
environment, and character makes it very difficult to predict whether
treatment will work. Just as two individuals with similar cancers may
respond differently to the same chemotherapy, two juveniles diag-
nosed with conduct disorder may respond differently to identical
treatments.
Second, the success of a particular treatment will almost always de-
pend on its quality; as with most things, the government gets what it
pays for. Budgets for therapy and rehabilitation are often quite lim-
ited. Some juveniles could be treated effectively, but the necessary
treatment is not adequately funded. Several courts have interpreted
"amenability to treatment" to mean amenability to treatment with ex-
isting resources.44 Consequently, juveniles from affluent families are
more likely to be found amenable to treatment. There are two rea-
sons for this. First, affluent families are more likely to be able to pay
for testing and experts to establish that their child is treatable. 45 Sec-
41. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
42. See generally Slobogin, supra note 35.
43. See, e.g., id.; Lisa M. Flesch, Note, Juvenile Crime and Why Waiver Is Not the Answer, 42
FAM. CT. REV. 583 (2004).
44. See, e.g., State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Reed, 863 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Or. Ct. App. 1993)
(evaluating a request for transfer to adult court inthe context of § 419.533(1)(d)(A) of the Ore-
gon Revised Statutes, which was repealed in 1993, and included the factor of amenability of the
child to treatment and rehabilitation); Slobogin, supra note 35, at 310-11 (noting that most states
require that treatment be available to the juvenile court).
45. Sacha M. Coupet, Comment, What to Do with the Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The Role of
Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile Jus-
tice System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1319 n.85 (2000) ("[C]lients who do not have resources to
2007]
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ond, these families are also more likely to be able to pay for the treat-
ment themselves if there is no public program available. 46
Even if resources for evaluation and treatment are made available,
diagnosing misbehaving adolescents can be tricky. Because normal
teens are quite volatile and subject to large mood swings, there is al-
ways a risk of mislabeling normal adolescent behavior as a symptom
of a mental disorder. Moreover, the standards for the various catego-
ries are somewhat broad, so separate therapists may diagnose differ-
ent conditions in the same teen. Furthermore, there is a significant
risk of either conscious or unconscious bias. For example, some schol-
ars have argued that minorities are more likely to be placed incor-
rectly into special education classes.47 Similarly, delinquent girls are
often treated much more harshly than boys because they confound
cultural gender expectations. 48 For example, runaway girls are more
frequently arrested than runaway boys.49
Girls are also more likely to be fleeing physical or sexual abuse.50
Overall, 61% of the girls in the juvenile justice system are victims of
physical abuse, and 54% of them are victims of sexual abuse.51 These
girls understandably suffer from a variety of psychological problems,
including anorexia, depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), aggression, disassociative behaviors, self-mutilation, suicide
pay for outside evaluators may have difficulty proving amenability to treatment to a judge dur-
ing a transfer hearing.").
46. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 6, at 757 ("At the 'soft end,' kids with drug, truancy, and
authority problems are diverted out of the juvenile justice system into the 'private sector system
of mental health and chemical dependency treatment and confinement.' . . . Middle-class kids
whose families have the resources to retain lawyers and kids with roots in affluent communities
are more likely to land at the 'soft end' than their lower-class counterparts." (quoting Barry C.
Feld, The Honest Politician's Guide to Juvenile Justice in the Twenty-First Century, 564 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 10, 15 (1999))).
47. See, e.g., Perry A Zirkel, Does Brown v. Board of Education Play a Prominent Role in
Special Education Law?, 34 J.L. & EDuc. 255, 258-59 (2005) (referring to "the long-standing
problem of the disproportionate representation of minority children in special education").
48. See, e.g., AM. BAR Ass'N & NAT'L BAR Ass'N, JUSTICE BY GENDER: THE LACK OF AP-
PROPRIATE PREVENTION, DIVERSION AND TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR GIRLS IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 15, 17, 19 (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/justiceby
genderweb.pdf (documenting that girls are disproportionately charged and detained for status
offenses and more likely to be returned to detention for technical probation violations); Alecia
Humphrey, The Criminalization of Survival Attempts: Locking Up Female Runaways and Other
Status Offenders, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 173-74 (2004) (referring to courts' "sexism
and paternalistic biases.., around girls' sexuality and perceived unfeminine behavior" and citing
studies that show girls receive harsher sanctions than boys).
49. See Humphrey, supra note 48, at 175 ("[W]hile girls and boys actually run away in equal
numbers, girls are arrested more often.").
50. Id. at 177.
51. Id. at 176.
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attempts, and substance abuse.52 Their history of repeatedly running
away is likely to be viewed as evidence that they are not amenable to
treatment with diversion, so they are incarcerated in disproportionate
numbers for status offenses. 53
3. The Case for Treatment
Despite the difficulties of evaluating amenability to treatment, a
strong case can be made for the rehabilitative model's emphasis on
the treatment of juvenile offenders. Treating minors is likely to be
effective because their behavior is easier to change for two primary
reasons. First, young people have immature brains that continue to
develop as they grow up. Consequently, appropriate therapy can lit-
erally help shape the brain as it matures to produce better behavior.
Second, because the juvenile brain is plastic and constantly changes in
response to the environment, a well-structured environment coupled
with other necessary therapies can dramatically improve current be-
havioral tendencies.5 4
A good example of how biological events and the environment in-
teract to shape behavior and the brain is a baby with colic. The event
starts with an infant experiencing stomach pain that leads to a predict-
able behavior-crying. Crying, in turn, causes certain brain changes.
Specifically, there is a drop in serotonin that affects impact receptors
in the brain. These receptors then turn genes on and off. The crying
behavior also elicits a response from parents, perhaps frustration or
spanking. The parental response triggers the child's perception of the
environment. If this perception includes pain, then the pain provokes
an emotional response like fear or anger, which in turn triggers a new
biological event: the increase in cortisol and norepinephrine, the
stress hormones associated with the fight or flight response.
A different parental response-say, cuddling-might spark an en-
tirely different chain of biochemical and emotional responses, perhaps
resulting in the release of more serotonin and dopamine, a biological
event that might mitigate the pain. From either response, the infant
learns what to expect from the environment and creates strategies for
dealing with the world.
52. Id. at 177.
53. Cf. id. at 169-75 (describing judges' desire to detain female status offenders, partly in
response to concerns that they will run away from unlocked facilities, and noting the legal tech-
niques used for ordering the detention).
54. See NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 262 ("Strategies to reduce violence have this miraculous
plasticity at their disposal.").
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Although biology, genetics, and environment all interact to affect
behavior, it is possible that biological interventions can mitigate ag-
gression. For example, some researchers suggest that certain medical
treatments might help juveniles who produce excess levels of the
stress hormone norepinephrine.55 Biological interventions can miti-
gate aggression by targeting three different mechanisms: biochemis-
try, genes, and brain anatomy.
Medications that alter brain biochemistry have shown some prom-
ise, but there are difficulties in medicating adolescents. Because teen
brains are not fully mature, they do not respond like adult brains, and
some medications may be more dangerous for minors than for adults.
For example, some antidepressants have been found to make teens
more prone to suicide.5 6 Because few drugs are tested on children, it
is often difficult to find safe medications. Furthermore, if courts were
to force juveniles to take such medications, serious issues of medical
ethics would arise. Generally, patients (or their parents) have the
right to weigh the risks and benefits of particular medications. Vesting
the government with this choice transforms medicine, which is nor-
mally a service provided to an individual, into a possible tool for gov-
ernment control.
Mandated medical treatment also poses the risk that politics will
dominate medicine. Medical decisions may be made inappropriately
for political purposes, like "get-tough-on-crime" policies.57 For exam-
ple, the California legislature passed a bill in 1996 authorizing child
molesters to be chemically castrated even though such medication was
not shown to prevent molestation and caused serious side effects.5 8
55. See id. at 127 (noting that propranolol, an antihypertension drug, can diminish aggression).
56. See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Public Health Advisory: Suicidality in Children
and Adolescents Being Treated with Antidepressant Medications (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.
fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/SSRIPHA20041O.htm (explaining that manufacturers had
been required to add a warning about an increased risk of suicide in teens using certain an-
tidepressants); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Medication Guide About Using Antidepressants in
Children and Teenagers, http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/2005/FebPI/Antidepressant
MedGuide.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2007); see also Andrea Cipriani et al., Suicide, Depression,
and Antidepressants, 330 BRIT. MED. J. 373, 373-74 (2005) ("[Iln children and adolescents the
balance between benefits and harms seems to be negative, with little evidence of efficacy and
increasing evidence of an association between exposure to [serotonin reuptake inhibitors] and
other antidepressant drugs and emergence of suicidal thought and behaviours."); Marianne
Szegedy-Maszak, 'Medication and Melancholy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 16, 2005, at 50
(noting that the FDA issued a black box warning that antidepressants could increase the risk of
suicide in children and teens).
57. Lori B. Andrews, Predicting and Punishing Antisocial Acts: How the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem Might Use Behavioral Genetics, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND
BIOLOGY 116, 133 (Ronald A. Carson & Mark A. Rothstein eds., 1999).
58. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006); Andrews, supra note 56, at 133
(listing effects "such as causing the user to grow breasts, gain weight, and suffer from osteo-
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This incident helps demonstrate how public fear of violence can be
politically exploited to the grave detriment of individuals.
Methods of attacking genetic problems are even more controversial.
Eugenic approaches such as abortion and sterilization raise serious
constitutional issues about reproductive privacy, as well as grave
moral issues like those that arose during the Holocaust. Genetic in-
terventions designed to reach present generations also raise ominous
ethical and medical issues. For example, gene splicing, a technique
that has been used with animals, may have unknown side effects be-
cause many genes affect more than one trait and traits often arise
from combinations of genes.
Anatomical approaches are also dangerous. Surgery on various
brain regions has not been very successful. For example, excising the
amygdala will moderate or even eliminate aggression. Unfortunately,
it also causes "psychic blindness. '59 Those who suffer from this condi-
tion are unable to feel much emotion or recognize it in others.60 It is
impossible for them to establish and maintain any relationships, and
therefore it is difficult for them to interact with others or hold a job.
Unlike biological interventions and other similar medical treat-
ments, various forms of psychological therapy pose relatively low risks
and have been demonstrated to be effective. 61 Behavioral therapy
works particularly well with youth.62 Unfortunately, therapies often
produce better behavior in structured environments like schools but
porosis"). But see NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 165 (citing Fred Berlin's study, which suggested
that Depo-Provera successfully treated 90% of paraphilia-motivated sex offenders).
59. See, e.g., RHAWN JOSEPH, NEUROPSYCHIATRY, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND CLINICAL
NEUROSCIENCE: EMOTION, EVOLUTION, COGNITION, LANGUAGE, MEMORY, BRAIN DAMAGE,
AND ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR 184 (2d ed. 1996) ("Terzian and Ore (1955) describe a young man
who, following bilateral removal of the amygdala, subsequently demonstrated an inability to
recognize anyone, including close friends, relatives and his mother. He ceased to respond in an
emotional manner to his environment and seemed unable to recognize feelings expressed by
others. He also demonstrated many features of the KlUver-Bucy syndrome (perserverative oral
'exploratory' behavior and psychic blindness), as well as an insatiable appetite."); id. at 193
("When [the amygdala] is damaged or functionally compromised, social-emotional intellectual
functioning becomes grossly disturbed."); NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 96-98 (describing experi-
ments with rhesus monkeys, and noting a similar result in a human patient). Currently the
amygdala, or parts of it, is excised in order to control extreme cases of epilepsy. See University
of Michigan Health System, Department of Neurosurgery Homepage, Epilepsy Program, http://
www2.med.umich.edu/departments/epilepsy// (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
60. JOSEPH, supra note 59, at 184.
61. See VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING
RISK 69 (1998) (noting that behavioral therapy "show[s] at least modest positive effect[s]");
Slobogin, supra note 35, at 328-30.
62. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 70.
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fail to change aggressive behavior at home or on the streets. 63 Other
times, particular therapies are actually counterproductive. 64 Never-
theless, meta-analyses demonstrate that psychological interventions
generally do help. 65
In order for psychological treatment to be successful, real behav-
ioral therapy must be available. Unfortunately, many juvenile facili-
ties are not equipped to provide such services. For example, the
Juvenile Detention Center in Chicago, which houses approximately
four hundred minors, has only two full-time psychologists. No matter
how hard they work, two psychologists cannot possibly test all these
children, let alone provide them with meaningful behavioral therapy.
In short, the 'administration' of a juvenile justice system based on a
rehabilitative model presents a viable alternative to a strict punitive
model. There are significant difficulties, however, and in many ways
the rehabilitative model might appear to have failed altogether. Un-
fortunately, state and federal governments have never invested
enough resources to give rehabilitation a fair chance. Without suffi-
cient resources, overcrowded and understaffed detention facilities
often become little more than warehouses for delinquents, so the pos-
sible advantages of a rehabilitative model are never allowed to come
to fruition.
C. Restorative Justice Model: Forgive and Forget
The models of justice discussed so far have focused attention on the
individual delinquent. Some new theories, however, have shifted that
attention. A few years ago, a new theory emerged: restorative jus-
tice.66 Unlike either the punitive or rehabilitative model, restorative
justice focuses not on correcting the deviant child, but on making the
community whole. Restitution to the community is at the core of the
restorative justice concept. Supported by the U.S. Department of Jus-
63. Craig F. Ferris, Summary: Cultivating Violence, 794 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sc. 318, 321
(1996) (citing a program for kindergarteners that significantly reduced "hyperactive, impulsive,
and aggressive behavior" at school, but not at home).
64. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 70-71 (citing a study by J. McCord in which boys who
received "a combination of vocational counseling; medical or psychiatric attention; a sojourn in
summer camps; and referrals to the Boy Scouts, YMCA, and other community programs" were
more likely than a control group to report problem drinking and stress-related diseases, and to
die younger, possibly due to "a development of harmful dependency on counselors").
65. Id. at 69.
66. This approach is also sometimes known as "balanced and restorative justice." For more
discussion of restorative justice, see Gordon Bazemore, The Fork in the Road to Juvenile Court
Reform, 564 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 81 (1999) and Lode Walgrave, Restoration in
Youth Justice, in 31 YOUTH CRIME AND YoUTH JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE AND CROSS-NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 543 (Michael Tonry & Anthony N. Doob eds., 2004).
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tice, a number of states modified their juvenile court acts to reflect
this approach. 67
Under a restorative justice approach, the goal is to make amends so
the child can rejoin the community. To accomplish this goal, it is
sometimes necessary to help the child become more competent and
capable of peacefully coexisting in a society. Restorative justice, how-
ever, specifically rejects rehabilitation. In this model, rehabilitation is
seen as stigmatizing; it separates the child from his community.68
Because the approach is not child-centered, it does not specifically
suggest a likely cause for juvenile crime. Its emphasis on socialization,
however, seems to imply that the problem merely reflects the imma-
turity and impulsiveness of juveniles. Theoretically, once juveniles are
made to understand how their behavior affects others, they will learn
to control themselves in order to fit into the community. The classic
example of the restorative justice approach is the child who steals a
candy bar from the grocery store and is forced to return it, apologize,
and work at the store sweeping up until he has paid for it.
A notion of redemption is inherent in this approach; confession
heals sinners and forgiveness heals victims. Hence, the approach em-
braces juveniles who readily admit guilt and seem willing to "repay
their debt" to the victim in one form or another. No attempt is made
to understand what motivated the behavior, or to identify any scien-
67. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-309.5(1) (2005) (citing "adhering to the principals
[sic] of restorative justice" as a goal of Colorado's "community accountability program"); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 985.303(2)(a) (West 2001) (authorizing the creation of Neighborhood Restorative
Justice Centers to impose sanctions on juvenile offenders, including restitution or work to be
done for the victim or the community as a whole); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-101(2)0)
(West 1999) (declaring that "juvenile justice policies ... shall be designed to ... (j) Hold minors
accountable for their unlawful behavior and not allow minors to think that their delinquent acts
have no consequences for themselves and others"); IND. CONST. art. 1, § 18 ("The penal code
shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice."); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-7038 (1997) (authorizing grants by the commissioner of juvenile justice for purposes
including "restitution programs" and "balanced and restorative justice programs"); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2600(3), 46:2610(C)(9) (West Supp. 2007) (including "balanced and restorative
justice programs" in the list of "exemplary sanctions" to be imposed, and citing
"[e]ncouragement of the principles and practices of balanced and restorative justice" as a goal of
programs for delinquent and at-risk juveniles); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A § 1214(3)(F)
(Supp. 2006) (creating an Office of Victim Services to "[aissist victims with obtaining victim
compensation, restitution and other benefits of restorative justice"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.24
subd. 2 (West 1997) (requiring county attorneys to establish "pretrial diversion programs" for
juveniles "to provide eligible offenders with an alternative to adjudication that emphasizes re-
storative justice").
68. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, BALANCED AND RESTORA-
TIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: A FRAMEWORK FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
27-28 (1997), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/framwork.pdf (explaining that unlike re-
storative justice, rehabilitation justice seeks to address dysfunction rather than assume current
competency).
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tific basis for correcting the problem. Redemption and reassimilation
are initially offered to all; if these fail, exile in the form of incarcera-
tion may be appropriate.
With the model's strong focus on assimilation into the community,
there is a significant risk of marginalizing "outsiders." Indeed, the fo-
cus of the model is on the younger, more trivial offenders who can be
successfully reintegrated into society, since it is far harder to mediate
between the perpetrators and the victims of violent crimes. As a re-
sult, in a restorative justice system, violent offenders tend to be seen
as outsiders who should be cast out and incarcerated.
Thus, the key issue for courts applying the restorative approach is
cooperativeness. They must determine if the appropriately apologetic
youngster can be successfully reintegrated into the group. The state
merely mediates the reconciliation between the offending child and
the community, using legal tools such as mediation, healing circles,
community service, and restitution.
It is too early to tell how well this system works in practice. From
my limited observation of this approach in the Chicago juvenile
courts, balanced and restorative justice has been used as a diversion
mechanism for less serious offenses. Although broad claims for suc-
cess have been made, there is no hard data available to evaluate the
success of this approach. 69 For more serious offenses, the references
to balanced and restorative justice in the Juvenile Court Act 70 seem to
be window dressing, and the Chicago juvenile courts largely proceed
with business as usual by continuing to apply the normal blend of pu-
nitive and rehabilitative approaches.
D. Assimilative Model: Shape Up or Ship Out
The assimilative model is similar to the restorative justice approach
in its emphasis on the assimilation of juvenile offenders back into the
community. It differs, however, in that it recognizes that both nature
and nurture may play a part in the creation of juvenile crime. Chil-
dren who commit crimes are seen as more than merely immature and
impulsive; they are the product of bad parenting, bad choices, and a
toxic culture.
Unlike restorative justice with its emphasis on redemption, the as-
similative model focuses on a more purely utilitarian set of premises.
69. In a speech at the DePaul University College of Law on October 25, 2006, James Mc-
Carter, the Chief State's Attorney for the Juvenile Division, claimed that the Cook County Bal-
anced and Restorative Justice Program had reduced juvenile incarcerations by 50%. But no data
has been released that verifies this claim.
70. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-1 to 7-1.
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It seeks the greatest good for the greatest number and assumes that
whatever works is good. The question is simple: What will work to
change the child's behavior and protect society?
Scientifically, the assimilative model is influenced by neuroscience,
behavioral genetics, and eugenics. The model recognizes that there
are multiple influences on-and contributing causes to-delinquency.
For example, environment can aggravate or trigger latent genetic pre-
dispositions, or it may cause biochemical or anatomical changes in the
brain. All of these may, in turn, lead to aggression or crime.
Whatever the cause of the undesirable behavior, the goal is to
change it and reassimilate the child. Thus, the groups marginalized by
this model are behaviorally defined: criminals, the mentally ill, the
mentally impaired, and the culturally resistant. Those who cannot or
will not change their behavior must be isolated to protect society.
Thus, the crucial question for the assimilative model is whether the
child is incorrigible, as the state should do whatever it can to control
the child's behavior. Possible measures include psychotropic drugs,
behavioral therapy, foster placements, curfews, and ultimately incar-
ceration. The assimilative model takes no stands on procedural issues,
such as whether a juvenile court or an adult court handles a matter.
What counts is that the system works.
E. Preventive Model: An Ounce of Prevention
Is Worth a Pound of Cure
Like the assimilative model, the preventive model is basically utili-
tarian. It seeks to prevent harm to society, and whatever method pro-
tects the greatest number of people is the correct approach to take.
The preventive model also sees a combination of nature and nurture
as the source of juvenile delinquency. Bad genes, bad environments,
and bad choices lead to antisocial behavior. Relying heavily on be-
havioral genetics, neuroscience, and sociology, the preventive model
seeks to identify the causes of aggression and crime and eliminate
them before harm occurs. The critical issue for courts following this
model is the dangerousness of the juvenile.
It is this emphasis on prevention that sets the preventive model
apart. It is proactive rather than reactive and could easily be summed
up with a familiar motto: "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure." Some measures reflective of this model, like preventive de-
tention 71 and curfews, 72 are quite controversial. Others, like limiting
71. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 56, 69 & nn.55-56 (2004) (suggesting that preventive detention is justified when the
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the driving privileges of teens73 or limiting the sale of alcohol to mi-
nors,74 are less so.
Some of these preventive measures assume that children have di-
minished constitutional rights. For instance, in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to
test pregnant women's urine for drugs without their consent. 75 How-
ever, one year later in Board of Education of Independent School Dis-
trict No. 92 v. Earls, the Supreme Court permitted similar urine tests
to be performed on all high school students engaged in extracurricular
activities. 76 In both cases, the government acted without any individu-
alized suspicion to search for drugs without consent. The Court, how-
ever, noted that the Fourth Amendment rights of high school students
are different in a school setting.77
As Earls illustrates, government actions to prevent delinquency
need not be aimed at any particular child. Indeed, many preventive
measures are aimed at the entire juvenile population, not just delin-
quents. For example, rules that limit teens' ability to obtain drivers'
licenses apply to all teens-good drivers and bad. Similarly, curfews
limit the hours that all adolescents can be on the streets, not just those
with a history of delinquency or a proclivity for crime. Different ratio-
nales are used to justify such over-inclusive measures. Sometimes, as
in Earls, adolescents' liberty interests are minimized. 78 Other times,
prediction of dangerousness is accurate; the detention is reserved for "different" individuals; the
potential harm is grave; due process is provided; and the consequences are humane); Christo-
pher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121 (2005) (advocating
preventive detention); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369-71 (1997) (holding that
detaining an individual past his prison sentence as a "sexually violent predator" was a civil com-
mitment, not a criminal proceeding, so such a detention did not violate double jeopardy and the
ex post facto prohibition).
72. See, e.g., Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 2004) (inval-
idating a curfew on First Amendment grounds); Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171,172 (2d
Cir. 2003) (invalidating a curfew on equal protection grounds). But see Hutchins v. District of
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding a curfew against constitutional
challenges).
73. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28-40 (LexisNexis 2001) (restricting driver's licenses to minors
who are enrolled in school); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-107 (West 2002) (providing for
graduated licenses for minors).
74. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-70 (LexisNexis 2001) (allowing parents and guardians to sue
people who give or sell their children alcohol); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-241 (2002).
75. 532 U.S. 67, 82-86 (2001).
76. 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002).
77. Id. at 829-30 ("Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in public schools than else-
where; the 'reasonableness' inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsi-
bility for children." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995))).
78. Id. at 832 ("We therefore conclude that the students affected by this Policy have a limited
expectation of privacy.").
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the extent of the danger posed is said to outweigh even strong liberty
interests.
Not all preventive measures focus on minors as a group. Some
scholars suggest that dangerous individuals should be identified and
segregated during childhood to prevent them from harming others. 79
Such preventive detention rests largely on claims of science. A num-
ber of studies have tried to determine whether antisocial toddlers be-
come mean school-aged children, and whether mean school-aged
children become violent adolescents.80 These tracking studies are but-
tressed by studies that try to determine whether aggression is influ-
enced more by the environment or by genetic inheritance.8' Similarly,
many biological and genetic factors have been posited as the source of
aggressive behavior in children and teens, including Fragile X Syn-
drome,82 XXY syndrome,83 high levels of testosterone,84 and low rest-
79. See Christopher Slobogin et al., A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of
Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 185, 195-96 ("Hendricks thus creates a new
category of people who may be preventively detained for long periods of time: non-insane peo-
ple who cannot 'adequately' control their behavior .... A good argument can be made that
dangerous youthful offenders should constitute one of the subcategories of people who are eligi-
ble for the regime authorized by Hendricks." (referring to Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997))).
80. See, e.g., Miriam K. Ehrensaft et al., Intergenerational Transmission of Partner Violence: A
20-Year Prospective Study, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 741, 748, 751 (2003) (noting
that "childhood behavior problems are among the most robust predictors of [partner] violence"
and that their study confirmed other longitudinal studies of behavior problems over the life
course); Helene Raskin White & Marsha E. Bates, Persistence of Aggressive and Nonaggressive
Delinquency in Relation to Neuropsychological Functioning, 794 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 413
(1996) (studying the persistence of aggressive behavior in children from age twelve to young
adulthood).
81. See, e.g., John Archer et al., The Association Between Testosterone and Aggression Among
Young Men: Empirical Findings and a Meta-analysis, 24 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 411 (1998); D.M.
Falkenbach et al., Do Changes in Testosterone (T) Levels Affect Human Aggression?, 27 AG-
GRESSIVE BEHAV. 260 (2001); D.B. O'Connor et al., Effects of Exogenous Testosterone (T) on
Self-Reported and Partner-Reported Aggression in Men, 27 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 220 (2001).
82. Jennifer Jewell, Fragile X Syndrome, http://www.emedicine.com/ped/topic800.htm (last
updated Sept. 13, 2006) ("Universal behavioral features of males with fragile X syndrome are
similar to those observed in patients with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)-
aggressive tendencies and attention deficits."); see also Patricia A. Jacobs et al., Aggressive Beha-
viour, Mental Sub-normality and the XYY Male, 208 NATURE 1351 (1965).
83. Cf Johannes Nielsen et al., Follow-up 10 Years Later of 34 Klinefelter Males with Karyo-
type 47, XXY and 16 Hypogonadal Males with Karyotype 46,XY, 10 PSYCHOL. MED. 345 (1980).
84. See, e.g., Dan Olweus et al., Testosterone, Aggression, Physical, and Personality Dimen-
sions in Normal Adolescent Males, 42 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 253 (1980) (reporting that aggres-
sive behavior is associated with higher levels of testosterone in male adolescents); Corinna N.
Ross et al., Intensity of Aggressive Interactions Modulates Testosterone in Male Marmosets, 83
PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 437 (2004); Elizabeth J. Susman et al., Gonadal and Adrenal Hormones:
Developmental Transitions and Aggressive Behavior, 794 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 18 (1996)
(discussing the complex role of testosterone and other hormones in aggression).
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ing heart rates.85 Although many of these theories have been
discredited,86 there can be little doubt that the search is on to identify
a genetic contribution to aggression and, if possible, find a way to con-
trol it.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the five models of juve-
nile justice discussed above yield five corresponding critical issues: (1)
culpability, (2) treatability, (3) incorrigibility, (4) cooperativeness, and
(5) dangerousness. It remains to be seen what insights behavioral ge-
netics can contribute toward addressing these issues.
III. BEHAVIORAL GENETICS
Scientists have used at least four different techniques to search for
genetic sources of aggression: (1) heritability studies, (2) brain bio-
chemical studies, (3) animal studies, and (4) genetic mapping of
targeted populations. Given the scope of this Article, the first three
methods are of particular importance and will be treated in turn.
A. Heritability: To What Extent Is Aggression Explained by
Genetics Rather than the Environment?
Medical science has come to accept that multiple factors contribute
to various conditions or behaviors. For example, heart disease is com-
monly thought to be the product of several factors, including heredity,
diet, exercise, and smoking habits. Geneticists call the genetic contri-
bution (as opposed to the environmental factors) "heritability."
In order to measure heritability, scientists often study families with
twins. Specifically, they compare statistics for identical (monozygotic)
twins to those of fraternal (dizygotic) twins.87 Since identical twins
come from both the same egg and the same sperm, they are geneti-
cally identical. 88 In contrast, fraternal twins are no more genetically
similar than any other sibling pair who share the same parents. They
85. See Jame Ortiz & Adrian Raine, Heart Rate Level and Antisocial Behavior in Children and
Adolescents: A Meta-analysis, 43 J. Am. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 154 (2004)
(examining forty studies that collectively supported the connection between low resting heart
rate and aggressive behavior).
86. See Daryl B. O'Connor et al., Exogenous Testosterone, Aggression, and Mood in
Eugonadal and Hypogonadal Men, 75 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 557, 565 (2002) (reporting that
exposure to additional testosterone does not seem correlated to aggression, whereas impulsivity
does).
87. NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 237-38 (describing studies of adopted children as well).
88. Id. at 237. Although identical twins usually continue to have identical genes throughout
life, over time their epigenetic marks that control the intensity of the activity of the genes gradu-
ally diverge. Such changes may be either random events or the result of differing life exper-
iences, or both. Thus, the genes of even identical twins may act differently over the course of a
lifetime. Nicholas Wade, Explaining Differences in Twins, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2005, at F5.
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developed from separate sperm and ova and therefore have only half
of their genes in common.
If a given trait has no genetic component, then it should be equally
common among twins and the general population. If, however, a par-
ticular trait is entirely genetically controlled, identical twins should be
twice as likely to share the trait as fraternal twins, because identical
twins have twice as much genetic information in common. For exam-
ple, a few decades ago scientists thought autism was caused entirely by
environmental factors, primarily emotionally cold mothers.8 9 If that
were so, identical twins raised apart would be no more likely to be
autistic than any two random children in the population. In fact, how-
ever, if one identical twin has autism, it is far more likely that the
other twin will have it as well. 90 Similarly, fraternal twins who share
more genetic information than members of the public would be more
likely to share the trait than the general population.
A similar analysis can be used to look for environmental factors.
All twins (both identical twins and fraternal twins) who share a home
have similar environments. If a trait is caused solely by environmental
factors, then the greater genetic similarity between identical twins is
irrelevant to the likelihood that they will both manifest that trait.
Hence, any trait that is caused exclusively by environment will be
shared no more frequently by identical twins than by fraternal twins.
Of course, few traits are explained solely by either the environment
or genetics. It is the two operating in conjunction that accounts for
most characteristics. Scientists use twin studies to measure the rela-
tive contributions of genetics and environment. If genes are a factor
that influences a trait, then the extent to which the trait is over-
represented in the identical twin pool may be a rough measure of how
heritable the trait is. Thus, by comparing concordances (the propor-
tion of identical twins who share the trait and the proportion of frater-
nal twins who share the trait), scientists can estimate heritability.
It is important to note, however, that these twin studies are merely
statistical measures over large populations: they do not prove a ge-
netic cause for any particular trait. Similarly, they do not predict how
a particular individual is likely to behave. Just because a trait seems
to be heritable does not establish an inevitable genetic connection; it
merely illustrates a higher-than-random statistical correlation.
89. James R. Laidler, The "Refrigerator Mother" Hypothesis of Autism, http://autism-watch.
org/causes/rm.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
90. See, e.g., A. Bailey et al., Autism as a Strongly Genetic Disorder: Evidence from a British
Twin Study, 25 PSYCHOL. MED. 63 (1995) (noting a high concordance among identical twins for
autism, and a much lower concordance among fraternal twins).
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Studies vary as to the heritability of aggression, although most show
some heritable component. 91 The varied results are hardly surprising
since there are several different types of aggression-defensive, pre-
meditated, and impulsive. 92 Defensive aggression is a survival strat-
egy common to most animals, including humans, and is not considered
abnormal when practiced within limits. 93 Premeditated aggression
consists of planned force used to achieve a specific goal. It may be
based on largely logical motives like wealth maximization, or it may
reflect a more disordered mental state like sociopathy. Typically, im-
pulsive aggression is more reactive; it is often described as an over-
reaction to a perceived threat. What complicates the inquiry further is
that each form of aggression can have several different causes, which
are likely to overlap with genetic and environmental factors that com-
prise the overall psychosocial situation of the individual.
B. Brain Biochemical Studies: What Happens in the
Brain of a Violent Individual?
Heritability studies suggest the degree to which traits are inherited,
but they do not directly isolate the mechanisms by which those traits
are inherited and expressed. Therefore, scientists must also look
closely at brain biochemistry to gain insight into the biological mecha-
nisms of behavior.
At least two different biological patterns of aggression have been
identified.94 In one, aggressive individuals have higher levels of the
neurotransmitter norepinephrine. 95 These individuals are highly.
aroused with fast heart rates. 96 Such unusually elevated levels of
norepinephrine may be induced by long-term exposure to stress or
91. See Emil F. Coccaro, Neurotransmitter Correlates of Impulsive Aggression in Humans, 794
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 82 (1996) (citing conflicting studies on the effect of various neurotrans-
mitter levels).
92. Id.
93. Id.; see also Darlene Francis et al., The Role of Early Environmental Events in Regulating
Neuroendocrine Development: Moms, Pups, Stress, and Glucocorticoid Receptors, 794 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. ScI. 136 (1996) (describing the hormones and neurotransmitters that are secreted
when an organism experiences stress).
94. Nicolle M.H. van de Wiel et al., Cortisol and Treatment Effect in Children with Disruptive
Behavior Disorders: A Preliminary Study, 43 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
1011 (2004); see also NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 128 (referring to "a differential responsiveness
that distinguishes two important types of violent behavior--one characteristic of people who feel
unnecessarily threatened and the other of people who don't seem to feel anything at all").
95. NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 128 (referring to several human studies). Increases in
norepinephrine in the brain increase aggression. Id. at 127.
96. Id. at 126 ("Anger ... is a reaction to threat, a physiological call to arms that revs up the
heart, coils muscles, and sends blood pressure soaring."). It also notes that this is the result of
monoamine transmitters, such as norepinephrine.
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pain.97 Inversely, hostile confrontations also cause the brain to create
more norepinephrine and a faster heart rate. 98 Hence, threatening or
stressful situations seem to elicit this reactive form of aggression,
which is an exaggerated version of the fight or flight response. 99
There is some evidence that beta-blocker drugs designed to treat hy-
pertension reduce both aggressive tendencies and the nature of the
aggression manifested, thus making it less destructive. 100 Similarly,
both animal and human studies suggest that antidepressant drugs de-
crease impulsive aggression. 101
In contrast, another group of aggressors appears to be just the op-
posite. These individuals seem to have inherited a tendency to have
lower levels of MAOA, which affects neurotransmitters. 10 2 This con-
dition is associated with low arousal, lowered heart rates, lower levels
of circulating cortisol, and lowered skin conductivity. 10 3 Many studies
have found that a low resting heart rate during childhood or adoles-
cence predicts eithei aggression or criminality in later years.104 Low
MAOA alone, however, may not be the sole cause of aggression. In
97. See id. (citing studies of rats that were physically restrained regularly and later put on an
electrified grid to fight with other rats).
98. Id. at 127.
99. See id. at 126 (noting that "the 'aggressive monoamines' have long been implicated on the
fight, as well as the flight, side of the response equation").
100. See NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 127 ("[Sltudies have demonstrated that the administration
of propranolol, an antihypertensive drug that blocks norepinephrine's action at beta receptors,
specifically reduces attack behavior, leaving defensive and escape behaviors untouched."); Coc-
caro, supra note 91, at 84 (citing clinical data that beta-blockers have "anti-aggressive effects").
101. See A. Cologer-Clifford et al., Effects of SerotonergicA and /, Agonists in Androgenic
Versus Estrogenic Systems for Aggression, 794 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 339 (1996) (studying the
effect of certain drugs on aggression in rodents); Ray W. Fuller, Fluoxetine Effects on Serotonin
Function and Aggressive Behavior, 794 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 90, 92-94 (1996) (citing studies
on the impact of the neurotransmitter serotonin on aggressive behavior in humans and animals;
studies of the effect of fluoxetine (a selective serotonin uptake inhibitor antidepressant) on ro-
dent aggression; a few small clinical studies of fluoxetine's effect on human aggressive behavior;
and a study in which fluoxetine reduced anger in human patients).
102. See generally Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Mal-
treated Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002); Robert M. Sade, Introduction: Evolution, Prevention,
and Responses to Aggressive Behavior and Violence, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 8, 11 (2004).
103. NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 129 (noting lower skin conductance and lowered heart rates in
individuals with antisocial personality disorders); see also id. at 185 tbl.6.1 (depicting a chart that
notes decreased cortisol levels in those with antisocial personality disorders).
104. See, e.g., Ortiz & Raine, supra note 85; Adrian Raine et al., Low Resting Heart Rate at
Age 3 Years Predisposes to Aggression at Age 11 Years: Evidence from the Mauritius Child
Health Project, 36 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1457, 1462 (1997). But see
Richard E. Tremblay et al., Physical Aggression During Early Childhood: Trajectories and
Predictors, 114 PEDIATRICS 43 (2004) (finding that a low resting heart rate was not associated
with measures of aggression, but that other factors, such as mothers with a history of antisocial
behavior during their school years, mothers who start childbearing early and smoke during preg-
nancy, and parents who have low income and serious problems living together, were predictive).
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the studies, low MAOA levels generally led to aggression when the
individuals had also experienced childhood abuse. 105
It is tempting to assume that individuals who exhibit low heart rates
and correspondingly low MAOA levels are genetically predetermined
to be overly aggressive or even sociopathic. But the physical traits
associated with low MAOA levels are not determinative predictors of
violence for four reasons.
First, the biological studies described above merely measure a sta-
tistical correlation between these traits and aggression rates in gen-
eral. They do not predict aggressiveness in any particular individual.
Similarly, a study might show biological or genetic characteristics as-
sociated with individuals who are likely to develop Type II diabetes,
but it would be unable to predict which members of a family would
become diabetic. One obvious reason biological studies alone cannot
predict which individuals will develop diabetes in middle age is that
nongenetic factors like diet, exercise, weight, and age affect the result.
Similarly, a complex behavior like aggression has multiple roots.
Second, most of the biochemical studies discussed above looked at
individuals who had already demonstrated aggressive behavior. There
is no data showing how many other individuals in the population have
low levels of serotonin, low arousal, slow heart rates, low skin conduc-
tance, and low MAOA, yet do not act violently. 10 6 Consider a hypo-
thetical study in which researchers select a group of nurses, find that
most of them share the XX chromosome pattern (characteristic of fe-
males), and then conclude that the XX chromosome pattern predis-
poses individuals to select nursing as a career. Just as environmental
factors can affect a woman's decision to become a nurse, environmen-
tal factors can affect which predisposed juveniles become criminals.
Without a wide-scale study of the entire population, the results are
generally skewed.
Third, isolating individuals with low MAOA would not adequately
address criminal violence. Even if this factor could adequately iden-
tify sociopaths (a questionable assumption), the number of sociopaths
in the general population is very small. So even if measuring MAOA
levels made it possible to predict which juveniles would develop into
105. Caspi et al., supra note 102; Sade, supra note 102, at 11.
106. Gary W. Kraemer & A. Susan Clarke, Social Attachment, Brain Function, and Aggres-
sion, 794 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCi. 121, 121 (1996) ("There is no indication of what proportion
of humans could be counted as having low 5-HT function [low serotonin levels associated with
low heart rate and low arousal] and yet never engage in violent behavior or come to the atten-
tion of the medical or justice systems.").
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sociopaths, the technique would not find the majority of violent
criminals among whom sociopaths are still a minority.
Fourth, screening would result in a number of false positives, risking
severe consequences for individuals who would never actually become
aggressive. Consider a hypothetical test based on the 2002 juvenile
crime rate. That year, 14 juveniles were arrested for violent crimes for
every 5000 juveniles in the U.S. population. 10 7 If the test classified
juveniles correctly 90% of the time (an extremely unlikely phenome-
non), then in a representative sample of 5000 juveniles, 13 violent
juveniles would be correctly identified and only one would be missed.
Unfortunately, of the remaining 4986 innocent juveniles in the sample,
499 would be misidentified as violent. This amounts to 38 innocent
juveniles misidentified for every one violent juvenile detected. Hence,
even with a highly accurate test, a large number of innocent juveniles
would be misidentified in order to find the few who are violent. 10 8
Studies of brain biochemistry can provide insight into the biological
component of aggression. It is inappropriate, however, to use the in-
formation learned from these studies to take preemptive actions that
are likely to harm innocent individuals.
C. Can Animals Be Genetically Altered to Be Aggressive?
Animal studies allow for more controlled and individualized experi-
ments than human studies. Typically, researchers use rats or mice to
test their hypotheses about which genes or combinations of genes in-
fluence a particular behavior. They splice genes into or out of the
animals and then compare how they react to various stimuli. Because
scientists can manipulate the genetic makeup of the animals, they can
isolate particular genes or portions of chromosomes that may contrib-
ute to a particular behavior. Of course, genetic variables are not the
sole cause of behavior in mice. Scientists need to provide an environ-
ment with appropriate stimuli to elicit the targeted behavior. But
these studies allow researchers to compare normal mice with geneti-
cally altered mice presented with the same stimuli. Although these
studies have helped identify some of the biochemistry of aggression,
107. Howard N. Snyder, Juvenile Arrests 2002, Juv. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 2004, at 4, available at http:/
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/204608.pdf ("In 2002, there were 276 arrests for Violent Crime In-
dex offenses for every 100,000 youth between 10 and 17 years of age .... ). Note that many of
the arrests likely involved juveniles who were arrested more than once, so this statistic merely
provides an upper bound on the number of juveniles who had at least one arrest. See id.
108. Cf Small, supra note 37, at 204-05 (using a similar analysis with different figures).
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there has been no single gene or set of genes that have been identified
as the cause of aggression.
D. Types of Teen Aggression: What Behavior Is Researched?
Teens engage in several different types of aggressive activities, so
researchers studying aggressive behavior must be careful to define
what they mean when they measure a subject's "aggressive" behav-
iors. Furthermore, since different motivations lie behind the various
types of aggression, studies that do not differentiate between these
different types of aggression may produce misleading findings.
Teen behavior mirrors the findings from certain animal behavior
studies that show social threat to be a frequent precursor to aggres-
sion.109 For instance, dominant rats maintain their dominance by at-
tacking subordinate rats or those who have invaded their territory."10
Subordinate animals retreat and appease the alpha animal for a pe-
riod of time; if pushed sufficiently, however, they will lash out dispro-
portionately, often willing to fight to the death.11" ' Adolescents often
behave in much the same way; some dominant teens maintain their
social position by bullying others, 1t 2 while those teens who are bullied
often pacify and retreat but can also overreact with lethal
aggression. 113
Frequently, responsible adults only recognize bullying in hindsight.
Abused partners and bullied peers are often too ashamed to complain.
Therefore, this form of aggression may be less likely to be measured
in studies. Moreover, as long as the perpetrators avoid excessive
force, adults are less likely to respond to these forms of aggression.
Therefore, the victims of bullying are often left to cope with the ag-
gression on their own.
There is also a form of group violence that often occurs in adoles-
cence." 4 This includes instances in which individual teens behave vio-
lently in a group even though they are not necessarily violent
109. See, e.g., NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 65-67, 70 (describing aggression by alpha rats against
subordinates and intruders).
110. Id. at 70.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Dan Olweus, Bullying at School: Knowledge Base and an Effective Intervention
Program, 794 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 265, 269 (1996) ("[Blullies have unusually strong needs
for power and dominance; they seem to enjoy being 'in control' and subduing others.").
113. See, e.g., Bullies-Schools, Parents Must Safeguard Children, WICHITA EAGLE (Kan.),
Sept. 14, 2005, at A8.
114. See, e.g., Howard N. Snyder, Juvenile Arrests 2003, Juv. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile
Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash., D.C.), Aug. 2005, at 2, available
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/209735.pdf ("[Jiuveniles are more likely to commit crimes
in groups and are more likely to be arrested than are adults.").
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individually. Sometimes this group violence is part of an initiation
rite. Typically, there is strong peer pressure to participate, which
ranges from razzing the reluctant participant to threats of violence or
death. The extent of the violence varies. Sometimes only property
damage, as in the trashing of a vacant house, is involved. Other times,
the violence is much more personal and ravaging, as in gang rapes or
murders. Such group violence cuts across socioeconomic lines and can
be found in sporting groups, 1 5 fraternities,"16 and gangs. 117 Property
crimes may not be counted as violence, but the other activities are
likely to be viewed as premeditated aggression. Consequently, a study
that defines violence narrowly may not encompass all of the instances
of group violence in which teens engage.
Finally, there is an instrumental form of aggression, in which
juveniles use aggression to get what they want. As with the other
types of aggression, the severity of the violence in this category varies
dramatically. Typical instrumental violence may occur in conjunction
with other criminal activity, as when juveniles use guns to rob stores
or protect their drug trade. Whether this form of aggression shows up
in statistics used for sociological studies depends on how the incidents
are reported. Thefts and drug offenses are not necessarily included in
115. See, e.g., R. Brian Crow & Scott R. Rosner, Institutional and Organizational Liability for
Hazing in Intercollegiate and Professional Team Sports, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 87, 90-91, 102-04
(2002) (describing various forms of physical hazing involving college and professional athletes);
Joshua A. Sussberg, Note, Shattered Dreams: Hazing in College Athletics, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
1421, 1424 n.22 (2003) (listing incidents of hazing, including violent acts, against members of
sporting teams); Patricia Wencelblat, Note, Boys Will Be Boys? An Analysis of Male-on-Male
Heterosexual Sexual Violence, 38 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 37, 38 (2004) (describing sexual
assaults of high school football players by other players).
116. See, e.g., Delta Tau Delta, Beta Alpha Chapter v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 973-74 (Ind.
1999) (documenting the scope of criminal activities including sexual assault in fraternities). Vio-
lence that occurs within a fraternity is often described by the term "hazing," which can have a
variety of different connotations. See, e.g., Michael W. Gosk, Comment, From Animal House to
No House: Legal Rights of the Banned Fraternity, 28 CONN. L. REV. 167, 167-69 (1995) (describ-
ing the violence associated with fraternities which led some to be banned); Sussberg, supra note
115, at 1423 n.21 (citing an alarming number of hazing incidents in fraternities, especially in
concert with alcohol consumption); Maria Newman, High School Group's Hazing Was Open
Secret, Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2002, at B5 (describing a "paddling" rite that took place
among a fraternity of high school students).
117. See RANDALL G. SHELDEN ET AL., YOUTH GANGS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 72-73, 134 (2d
ed. 2001) (noting the initiation rites common to many gangs); see also Katharine K. Baker, Sex,
Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 670 (1999) (describing the Spur Posse, a gang of white
high school students who developed a system of scoring points by having sexual conquests with
girls); Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape
Law, 85 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 15-16 (1994) (also describing the Spur Posse). This
violence is not just confined to male gangs. Female gang members also act violently toward each
other. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, Ganging Up on Girls: Young Women and Their Emerging Vio-
lence, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 93, 124 (1999) (describing female gang initiation rites, including group
sex and "catfights").
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aggression studies. If, however, the crimes are recorded as weapons
violations or aggravated assaults, then they are more likely to be
included.
All of this evidence shows that studies of aggression, including heri-
tability studies, brain chemical studies, and animal studies, require
that the researcher carefully identify the behavior to be measured. If
the behavior is defined too broadly, genetic or other biological contri-
butions to specific types of aggression may be overlooked. On the
other hand, if the behavior is defined too narrowly, genetic or other
biological contributions to an aggregate level of aggressiveness may be
missed.
IV. DOMESTIC ABUSE AS A FACTOR IN AGGRESSION
Abuse and violence are crucial factors in generating aggressive be-
havior. Scientists have demonstrated that "domestic violence has an
environmental effect on children's behavior problems independent of
genetic effects. ' 118 Minors between the ages of nine and twelve who
have been reported as abused or neglected are sixty-seven times more
likely to be arrested than other minors. 119 Abuse provides negative
social role modeling.'20 It also alters brain chemistry and, if pro-
longed, alters the very anatomy of the brain.121 Indeed, stress hor-
mones associated with abuse trigger genetic responses. As
neuroscientist Debra Niehoff explains, "[S]ocial stress has the power
to turn genes off and on. Within an hour of losing a fight, the experi-
ence has switched on the immediate early gene c-fos, presumably in
preparation for activating additional genes. ' 122 The biochemical re-
sponses to these changes can "actually reconstruct[ ] the brain, with
long-lasting consequences for neural function and behavior."'1 23 Sev-
118. Sara R. Jaffee et al., Influence of Adult Domestic Violence on Children's Internalizing and
Externalizing Problems: An Environmentally Informative Twin Study, 41 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1095, 1100 (2002).
119. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CHILDREN 2001 CREATING CONNECTED COMMUNI-
TIES: POLICY, ACTION, COMMITMENT 3 (2001), available at http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/
nationalfactsheet01.pdf (citing a 1996 study in Sacramento County).
120. Sociologists have documented this modeling effect, describing it using a "social learning
theory." See, e.g., David L. Burton, Male Adolescents: Sexual Victimization and Subsequent Sex-
ual Abuse, 20 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 277, 279, 282 (2003) (finding that typically
adolescent sexual abusers not only had been abused themselves, but also copied the methods of
abuse when they victimized others).
121. NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 112.
122. Id. at 133.
123. Id. at 186.
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eral heritability studies also confirm that the environment significantly
contributes to aggression and delinquency. 124
Both experiencing the abuse directly as a victim and indirectly as a
witness have been associated with subsequent aggression.' 25 Because
it is common for a family to scapegoat a single child, abuse may be
either a shared or a non-shared trait with siblings. 126 When scapegoat-
ing occurs, only one child may be targeted, and the experience of
abuse will vary among the children. In either case, a history of family
violence continues to be an important factor in predicting subsequent
aggression.
Although the precise mechanisms for the intergenerational trans-
mission of violence are still being discovered, we have learned a great
deal about why exposure to violence begets violence. Individuals who
are exposed to violence adapt to that environment in a variety of
ways, including the release of stress hormones in the body and brain
that increases the likelihood of a fight or flight response. 127 The cycli-
cal exposure to these chemicals over time changes both the biochemis-
try and the anatomy of the brain. 128 Specifically, functional MRIs of
individuals who have experienced long-term exposure to stress show
increased activity in the amygdala, the part of the brain that governs
strong emotions.129 This activity is experienced as a powerful internal-
124. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kramer, Commentary: Gene-Environment Interplay in the Context
of Genetics, Epigenetics, and Gene Expression, 44 J. Am. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHI-
ATRY 19 (2005); Alison Pike & Robert Plomin, Importance of Nonshared Environmental Factors
for Childhood and Adolescent Psychopathology, 35 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSY-
CHIATRY 560, 563 (1996) (noting that environmental experiences have a significant impact on
delinquency).
125. See, e.g., Cathy Spatz Widom & Michael G. Maxfield, A Prospective Examination of Risk
for Violence Among Abused and Neglected Children, 794 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 224, 229
(1996) ("Abused and neglected children have a higher likelihood of arrests for delinquency,
adult criminality, and violent criminal behavior than matched controls .... [C]ompared to con-
trols, abused and neglected children are arrested earlier, commit more offenses, and more often
become chronic or repeat offenders .... ").
126. Lynne Namka, Scapegoating-An Insidious Family Pattern of Blame and Shame on One
Family Member, http://www.angriesout.com/grownl9.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2007); see also
RICHARD RHODES, WHY THEY KILL: THE DISCOVERIES OF A MAVERICK CRIMINOLOGIST 136
(1999) (noting that violence within families is selective).
127. See generally Francis et al., supra note 93.
128. See NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 186-87.
129. See, e.g., Scott L. Rauch et al., Exaggerated Amygdala Response to Masked Facial Stimuli
in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Functional MRI Study, 47 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 769, 772
(2000) ("[P]atients with PTSD exhibited significantly greater amygdala responses [to masked-
fearful versus masked-happy faces]."); Paul J. Whalen et al., Human Amygdala Responsivity to
Masked Fearful Eye Whites, 306 SCIENCE 2061 (2004) (noting that subjects who had PTSD had
increased amygdala activity when shown fearful eyes). But see Ruth A. Lanius et al.,
Neuroimaging of Hyperaroused and Dissociative States in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, CPA
BULL., Aug. 2002, at 22 (noting that among sexual abuse survivors and other patients with
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ized fear that generates anger. Simultaneously, there is decreased ac-
tivity in the prefrontal lobe, which normally operates to smooth out
emotional impulses. 130 So at the very time that stress hormones are
causing the amygdala to generate powerful sensations of fear and an-
ger, the frontal lobe that helps an individual control himself shuts
down, significantly increasing the likelihood that fear and anger will
be manifested in aggressive behavior. When the individuals involved
are teens with immature prefrontal lobes, the lack of impulse control
is even stronger. Hence, the combined effect of exposure to violence
and the normal immaturity of the prefrontal lobe make it extremely
difficult for victimized adolescents to control their aggressive
impulses.
If one is to survive in a chaotic environment with intermittent vio-
lence, one must be constantly on the lookout for danger. Hence, vio-
lence also programs individuals to be hypervigilant:
When the entire experience [of physical trauma] is transferred to
memory, the labels stay put, branding details of the traumatic event
into the memories. Like loose threads on an old sweater, these
amygdala-enhanced details catch on every outstanding resemblance
to the original trauma, pulling fragments of the painful memory up
to conscious awareness over and over again.131
Therefore, teens who have been exposed to violence are far more
likely to interpret words, gestures, and other social cues as threaten-
ing. 132 Once a threat is perceived, these teens are quick to anger and
lash out because of the structural changes in their amygdalas and
prefrontal lobes. Even teens who have not been exposed to violence
have immature prefrontal lobes that make it difficult for them to con-
trol their behavior. For adolescents who have undergone changes due
to environmental violence, it is sometimes impossible for them to con-
trol their impulses.
Of course, not all adolescents exposed to violence respond in pre-
cisely the same way. Some become passive, hypervigilant, and fearful.
These children often become the targets for bullies and others who
sense their fear.133 Studies indicate that many girls who grow up in
abusive households find themselves victims of domestic violence later
PTSD, two distinct patterns emerge: 70% show heightened arousal, but 30% actually showed
decreased amygdala activity usually related to a dissociative state).
130. See NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 111.
131. Id. at 125.
132. See Sandra Graham & Colleen Halliday, The Social Cognitive (Attributional) Perspective
on Culpability in Adolescent Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 37, at 345, 352 (explain-
ing that hypervigilant youth are especially likely to interpret others' intentions as hostile).
133. Olweus, supra note 112, at 268.
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in life. 134 It is unclear why one teen responds to violence with more
violence, while another responds passively. Some have suggested that
an inherited characteristic, like the level of MAOA in the brain, deter-
mines the result.1 35 Others have suggested gender correlations. 136
Some scholars have posited that violence develops gradually in pre-
dictable stages.137 Although the early stages enable later progression
to violence, the later stages are not inevitable. 138 In essence, this the-
ory posits that violence is a learned behavior and that the learning can
be interrupted.139 According to criminologist Lonnie Athens, vio-
lence progresses in stages, from "brutalization" to "belligerency" to
"violent performances" and, finally, to "virulency.' 140
Brutalization, the first stage of the process, occurs when individuals
are treated cruelly by key members of intimate social groups, such as
families, gangs, or cliques, 141 and can occur in three ways: "violent
subjugation, personal horrification and violent coaching. ' 142 Subjuga-
tion occurs when an intimate authority figure, like a parent or a gang
leader, uses violence to enforce obedience.1 43 At some point the child
becomes fearful and submits, but then becomes humiliated and an-
gry.144 Horrification occurs when children witness violence against
another intimate like a sibling or a parent: "Violent subjugation of
someone cherished [is] . . . 'exceedingly traumatic for the subject."145
The child feels obligated to try to protect his loved one but is power-
less to do so. Feeling both impotent and afraid fuels both rage and
shame. 146 Violent coaching occurs when an authority figure encour-
134. Deborah Epstein et al., Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 8-9 (1999). But
see Ehrensaft et al., supra note 80, at 749 (finding that exposure to child abuse did not predict
being abused by a partner, but exposure to violence between parents did predict such later
victimization).
135. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
136. Widom & Maxfield, supra note 125, at 229-30. But see Myrna S. Raeder, A Primer on
Gender-Related Issues That Affect Female Offenders, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4, 11 (2005) (documenting
that girls and women also become more aggressive as a result of prior exposure to violence).
137. RHODES, supra note 126, at 111 (summarizing ideas presented by Lonnie Athens); see
also NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 52 ("This inclusive biology views violence as a developmental
process rather than a genetic or cultural mandate.").
138. RHODES, supra note 126, at 111
139. Id. at 316-17.
140. Id. at 112.
141. Id.
142. Id. (emphasis omitted).
143. Id. at 112-13.
144. RHODES, supra note 126, at 113.
145. Id. at 117.
146. Id. at 118.
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ages the minor to act violently. 47 The authority figure belittles any
attempts minors make to smooth over conflicts or flee. Children are
taught that it is their duty to stand up for themselves and to be pre-
pared to physically attack others when necessary. The authority figure
often tells stories glorifying those who triumph in physical fights. 148
Sometimes, especially within gangs, the coaching is coercive. If the
minor does not act aggressively toward an outsider, he will be a victim
of the gang. 149
As stated above, brutalization often occurs in the context of inti-
mate violence either in the home or on the street: "Although brutali-
zation and child abuse are not synonymous, serious child abuse is
always potentially brutalizing.' 150 Indeed, some scientists have pos-
ited that early child abuse may contribute to the low arousal observed
in some violent individuals.151 Not all brutalized children become vio-
lent, but almost all violent juveniles have been brutalized.1 52
Unfortunately, when children are incarcerated they are typically
further brutalized, horrified, and coached. 153 Gang presence, as well
as exposure to a larger, concentrated population of aggressively vio-
lent youth, makes these facilities breeding grounds for aggression and
violence. Because experiencing abuse causes children to develop vio-
lent tendencies and incarceration often serves to further the cycle of
violence, strategies formulated to reduce juvenile crime and deal with
147. Id. at 119-20.
148. Id. at 121.
149. See, e.g., Nat'l Drug & Safety League, Leading the Fight Against Gangs in the United
States, http://www.hopefs.org/Behavior/thefightagainstgangs.html (visited Apr. 17, 2007) (noting
that gangs use violence to intimidate recruits into committing violent acts).
150. RHODES, supra note 126, at.314.
151. See, e.g., Adrian Raine, Autonomic Nervous System Factors Underlying Disinhibited, An-
tisocial, and Violent Behavior: Biosocial Perspectives and Treatment Implications, 794 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 46, 56 (1996) ("It is ... possible that the environmental influence of experienc-
ing environmental stress in early childhood results in reduced autonomic arousal.").
152. See, e.g., Ehrensaft et al., supra note 80, at 748-51 (noting that although a history of
abuse is strongly associated with becoming an abuser, a variety of factors can either exacerbate
or mitigate that course); Adam M. Tomison, Intergenerational Transmission of Maltreatment,
http://www.aifs.gov.au/nch/issues6.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2007) (distinguishing the statistics
generated by retrospective and prospective studies that demonstrate that although most abusers
were abused as children, most abused children do not grow up to be abusers); see also Raeder,
supra note 136, at 6 (noting that adult female inmates in Cook County Jail had suffered "child
abuse, sexual assault, and domestic violence at rates two and three times the national average");
Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Does Child Abuse Cause Crime? 7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper 12171 (2006)), available at http://www.Nber.org/papers/wl2171 (citing Cathy
Spatz Widom, Does Violence Beget Violence? A Critical Examination of the Literature, 106
PSYCH. BULL. 3 (1989) (noting that child abuse victims are 53% more likely to be arrested as a
juvenile and 38% more likely to be arrested for a violent crime)).
153. RHODES, supra note 126, at 314 ("Detention centers in particular are notorious for ad-
vancing violentization.").
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juvenile offenders will be much more effective if they consider this
essential information.
V. COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY
A. The Current Absence of Community Accountability
Holding juveniles individually accountable for their aggression is
like treating heart disease with medications, but locking the patient in
a smoke-filled room, chaining him to a recliner, and providing him
only fats and sweets as nourishment. A purely biological remedy is
unlikely to succeed unless environmental factors are corrected.
Unfortunately, the juvenile justice system completely ignores the
social context of violence. The problem of adolescent aggression is
viewed as an individual character flaw, and the consequences are im-
posed solely upon the delinquent minors. Thus, a common problem
with all five theories of juvenile justice is that they place all the burden
of change on the children, calling upon them to be accountable. But
their behavior does not occur in a vacuum. The scientific studies dis-
cussed above demonstrate that genetic and neurological factors oper-
ate in conjunction with an exposure to child abuse and other violent
environments to make violent impulses very difficult to resist.
Niehoff explains that "[v]iolent behavior is open to change, but...
the brain must develop a different attitude toward the outside world,
and the world itself must be different. ' 154 Incarcerating children, or
even treating them and returning them to the same environment that
contributed to their problems in the first place, is an exercise in futil-
ity. If society is serious about attacking the problem of youth aggres-
sion, it must attack the most significant environmental causes of that
aggression: child abuse and domestic violence.
Unfortunately, the law has undermined many attempts to protect
children from violence in their homes. The Supreme Court has con-
sistently ruled that states have no duty to protect children from abuse,
even when a child is being supervised by child protective services or a
state court protective order is in place.15 5 Indeed, the Court has made
state child welfare agencies entirely unaccountable for the quality of
their services, holding that parents lack standing to sue these agencies
154. NIEHOFF, supra note 15, at 263.
155. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005); DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
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even when their children are lost in the foster care system 56 and that
state agents are not liable for their conduct. 157
States have also enacted legislation that excludes a number of chil-
dren from protective services. 158 In Illinois, for example, those over
age thirteen who are adjudicated delinquent may not be placed by the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).' 59 As a result,
if a thirteen-year-old girl who is sexually abused at home runs away
and becomes homeless, she will not be provided any shelter or ser-
vices if she has turned to prostitution or theft to support herself. In
essence, these abused children are simply abandoned by the state.
Similarly, Illinois DCFS has an unofficial policy of not responding
to reports of sexual abuse when the abuser does not live with the
child.' 60 Accordingly, if a child reports to a teacher that his uncle is
molesting him, DCFS will not respond unless the uncle lives with him.
Hence, if the parents disbelieve the child, the child is left in the abu-
sive situation.
Private resources are also insufficient. Most domestic violence shel-
ters are overcrowded and have limited beds available. 61 Even worse,
most shelters will not permit males over the age of twelve to stay
there. 162 So if an abused woman has a teenage son, she may face an
impossible dilemma. If she goes to the shelter, she must leave her son
with the abuser. If she does not go, she must remain in the abusive
environment.
Finally, although there are many professionals who are required to
report suspected abuse to the appropriate state agency, many adults
156. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992).
157. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
158. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/5(1) (West 1999) ("A minor charged with a crimi-
nal offense under the Criminal Code of 1961 or adjudicated delinquent shall not be placed in the
custody of or committed to the Department by any court, except a minor less than 13 years of
age ....
159. Id.
160. Personal Conversation with a DCFS attorney, who wished to remain anonymous (Jan.
2006).
161. For example, in 2002 in New York City 2649 people were turned away from shelter beds
due to lack of space. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., THE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT: 2002 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 6
tbl.3 (2002), available at http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/reports/2002_domesticviolence
report.pdf.
162. See, e.g., LUPiTA PATTERSON, WASH. STATE COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
MODEL PROTOCOL: ON WORKING WITH BATTERED WOMEN AND THEIR TEENAGE BOYS IN
SHELTER 1 (2003), available at http://www.wscadv.org/Resources/protocol-teenage-boys.pdf
("[Ifn many domestic violence shelters [there] is an age limitation on male children in shelter.");
Sheila Y. Moore, Adolescent Boys Are the Underserved Victims of Domestic Violence (Dec. 26,
1999), http://www.casamyrna.org/new/op-ed.html (noting that not a single domestic violence
shelter in Massachusetts accepted teenaged boys until 1999).
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who see abusive behavior in public ignore it. Consequently, children
learn that such abuse is acceptable and normal. All too often cultural
norms of family privacy prevent individuals from acting to help
abused children. In essence, the entire community has abandoned
abused children.
Obviously, children are too vulnerable to be able to protect them-
selves from violence in the home. They must rely on others to protect
them. State law usually requires that state child protective agencies
and the police have exclusive power to intervene in such situations.
Nevertheless, according to the Supreme Court, a state has no duty
either to intervene to protect children or to act without gross negli-
gence when it chooses to intervene. 163
Consider the case of three-year-old Joshua DeShaney.164 Numer-
ous individuals reported that Joshua's father was beating him. 165
Joshua's father agreed to place him in preschool, which would have
allowed teachers to monitor Joshua's condition. 66 Unfortunately,
Joshua's father failed to live up to his agreement. Every time the state
social worker came to visit, "Joshua was too ill to see her. ' 167 She
never demanded to see Joshua to check for further abuse. More re-
ports came in. The social worker admitted that she was dreading the
day that she would get the phone call telling her that little Joshua was
dead. 168 Still, she "took no action. 1 69 Eventually, Joshua's father
beat Joshua until he was so brain-damaged that he would have to be
institutionalized for life. 170
Joshua's mother sued Winnebago County, the Department of Social
Services (DSS), and individual DSS employees for their failure to pro-
tect Joshua. 171 She argued that Joshua, like prisoners, had a substan-
tive due process right to be protected by the state. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, stating that prisoners only have a right
to be protected because the state has limited their liberty to protect
themselves.172 Thus, the Court ignored the fact that state law limited
the abilities of others to intervene and protect Joshua, including his
163. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202; see also Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768 (holding that the plaintiff
had no "property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband," so
the police's refusal to protect her and her children did not violate her due process).
164. DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189.
165. Id. at 192-93; id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 192 (majority opinion).
167. Id. at 193.
168. Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (majority opinion).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 198-99.
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stepmother, doctors, nurses, and neighbors. 173 In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court seemed to engage in the fiction that toddlers can ade-
quately protect themselves against abuse.
The Court further limited the rights of extended families to inter-
vene when it denied grandparents the right to visit their grandchildren
without parental consent. 174 Although Justice O'Connor's opinion for
the plurality suggested that the rule might be different if the grandpar-
ents could prove harm to the child, 175 the Court has consistently af-
firmed a constitutional right of parents to isolate their children. 176
Thus, children remain at risk for abuse. Private individuals are denied
the right to intervene on their behalf but the state has no duty to pro-
tect them. In essence, DeShaney held that in spite of the state's power
to intervene under parens patriae, the Due Process Clause does not
create a substantive due process right for children to be protected
from known parental abuse. 177 It could easily be argued that in many
ways these legal rules enable and protect abusers.
The next Supreme Court case to raise these issues, Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales,178 provided a similar disturbing outcome. Mr. Gon-
zales apparently had a history of beating both his wife and his chil-
dren. 179 Mrs. Gonzales filed for divorce and obtained a protective
order that specifically limited Mr. Gonzales' access to his children and
ordered the police department to enforce the terms of the protective
order.' 80 At about 5:00 p.m., Mr. Gonzales took the children from
their front yard without permission. Mrs. Gonzales called the police
173. Cf id. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Through its child-welfare program, in other
words, the State of Wisconsin has relieved ordinary citizens and governmental bodies other than
the Department [of Social Services] of any sense of obligation to do anything more than report
their suspicions of child abuse to DSS.").
174. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000).
175. Id. at 68 ("[T]he [child's grandparents] did not allege, and no court has found, that [the
child's mother] was an unfit parent. That aspect of the case is important, for there is a presump-
tion that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.").
176. See, e.g., id. (holding that grandparents could not be awarded visitation rights over the
objection of the mother); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that the biologi-
cal mother and her husband could prevent visitations with the child's biological father); In re
Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (holding that a biological father could gain
custody of his daughter who had been placed with adoptive parents for over two years).
177. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
178. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
179. Mrs. Gonzales had "applied for and [been] granted a restraining order from a Colorado
trial judge, who found a risk of irreparable injury and found that physical or emotional harm
would result if [her] husband were not excluded from the family home." Id. at 787 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Since the restraining order covered both Mrs.
Gonzales and the children, see id., it is extremely likely that Mr. Gonzales had abused all of
them.
180. Id. at 751-53 (majority opinion).
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at 7:30 p.m. to have the protective order enforced. 181 The police told
Mrs. Gonzales to call back at 10:00 p.m. At about 8:30 p.m., Mrs.
Gonzales discovered that her estranged husband had taken the chil-
dren to an amusement park.182 She asked the police to recover the
children. They refused and told her to call back at 10:00 p.m. 183 At
10:10 p.m., Mrs. Gonzales again asked for enforcement of the order.
The police told her to call again at midnight. Mrs. Gonzales called the
police again at midnight and again at 12:10 a.m. They told her they
would send an officer out. They did not do so. At 12:50 a.m., she
went to the police station and again asked for the protective order to
be enforced. The police officer refused to pick up her husband and
instead went to dinner. 184 Around 3:20 a.m., her estranged husband
came to the police station and opened fire. He had killed the three
children, who were found in the back seat of his car. 185
Mrs. Gonzales claimed that she had a property interest in the pro-
tective order, which triggered a procedural due process right to have
the order enforced. 186 The Supreme Court rejected that argument
and reasserted the reasoning of DeShaney. 87 Once again, the Court
rejected a state duty to protect children from domestic violence. This
time, however, its ruling was even more dangerous because it took the
teeth out of state protective orders and authorized police officers to
ignore them at will.
B. Changes in the Law Are Needed to Assure
Community Accountability
Cases like DeShaney and Castle Rock demonstrate the three-prong
failure of government to respond to child abuse: (1) government pro-
hibits private actors from intervening, (2) but assumes no duty to in-
tervene itself, and (3) refuses to be held accountable for its gross
negligence when it does intervene. Legal changes should be made at
the judicial, congressional, and state levels to actively combat abuse.
181. Id. at 753.
182. Id.
183. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753.
184. Id. at 753-54.
185. Id. at 754.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 768.
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1. Courts Must Impose a Duty on the State to Exercise Reasonable
Care to Protect Children from Suspected Abuse
First, courts must impose a duty on the state to exercise reasonable
care to protect children from suspected abuse. The standard of care
should be analogous to gross negligence. The state should not be held
responsible for mere mistakes of judgment when a reasonable actor
could not know the outcome. When the state has actual knowledge of
ongoing abuse, however, it has a moral duty-and should have a legal
duty-to take some protective action. Police and social workers
should not be allowed to stand by passively while children are beaten
into vegetative states or killed. Therefore, the state should be liable
when state actors willfully or recklessly fail to act. Refusing to enforce
a protective order should be considered a per se act of gross negli-
gence unless the violation is so trivial that no possible harm could
occur.
2. Congress Should Create a Federal Remedy for Violation of the
Duty to Protect Children from Abuse
Second, federal law should be amended to create a remedy under
42 U.S.C. § 1983188 for violation of the duty to protect children from
abuse. A federal remedy is crucial for two reasons. First, states may
be reluctant to enforce damage actions against themselves, so state
remedies are likely to be ineffective. Children should not have to rely
upon the states to police themselves. A private remedy that could be
enforced in federal court would create an incentive for state compli-
ance. Second, § 1983 remedies permit the recovery of attorney's fees,
so that poor plaintiffs are not barred from recovery by the costs of a
lawsuit.
There are three routes to creating a § 1983 remedy: (1) by reversing
DeShaney and Castle Rock and acknowledging that children have an
existing constitutional right to be protected from abuse; (2) by enact-
ing legislation to give children a federal statutory right to protection;
or (3) by amending the Constitution to provide children with an inde-
pendent constitutional right to protection. The Supreme Court has
shown little interest in the first option, and the Constitution is difficult
to amend.
Although creating a federal statutory right seems the most feasible,
such legislation needs to be carefully drafted. The first obstacle is sep-
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (allowing injured parties to sue anyone, other than a judge acting
in his judicial capacity, who violates their constitutional or federal statutory rights under color of
state law).
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aration of powers.' 89 If the legislation appears to be a congressional
attempt to overturn DeShaney and Castle Rock, then the Court is
likely to invalidate it. Congress and the Supreme Court occasionally
engage in a dialogue about the meaning of the Constitution, and fre-
quently these differences can be overcome.1 90
The second possible stumbling block is that § 1983 actions must rest
on either a federal law or a constitutional violation. Currently, no fed-
eral statute applies. If a constitutional violation can be found, then no
legislative action would be needed and remedies would not depend on
fickle politics. The Court has already rejected both a substantive due
process claim' 9' and a procedural due process claim. 192
VI. EQUALITY THEORIES
The most likely source for a constitutional violation may be an
equal protection claim. Such a claim would have to rest on an innova-
tive theory of equal protection. There are at least three different ways
to define "equal" for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause: (1)
formally equal, (2) substantively equal, and (3) hedonically equal.
A. Formally Equal: Identical
Formal equality demands equal treatment and defines "equal" to
mean "identical." The goal is to treat identical individuals the same
and different individuals differently. Formal equality can be con-
trasted to substantive equality, which defines "equal" to mean "having
equivalent access to power." The goal of substantive equality is to
remedy the subordination of those who are different. To illustrate the
distinction, consider a sighted student and a blind student arriving to
take an exam. According to principles of formal equality, it is suffi-
cient if both students are given the same examination, bluebooks for
answers, and pencils. Because they are treated identically, they have
been treated equally, even though one is able to complete the exam
and the other is not. If the blind student fails, it is not because he has
189. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding
that the Supreme Court has the power to determine what constituted a constitutional violation
and that congressional power to enforce civil rights laws under § 1983 did not include the right to
change the effect of a prior Supreme Court ruling).
190. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (strengthening employment discrimination protection after Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U.
L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1992) (describing the interplay between Supreme Court decisions and congres-
sional legislation on issues such as discrimination against women, abortion, and habeas corpus).
191. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
192. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768.
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been treated unequally, but because of "natural" differences between
the students. To give the blind student an exam in Braille and a laptop
is to extend "special" treatment.
Embedded in formal equality are two unarticulated sub-issues: (1)
Identical to whom? and (2) Identical in what way? As Professor
Martha Minow explains, one can only be different if one is different
from some standard trait.1 93 Thus, one is only short in comparison to
the norm of a tall person, and a child is only different in comparison to
an adult. Consequently, formal equality not only imposes an unstated
norm, it also creates hierarchy. The unstated norm is the preferred
state, and those who are "different" are implicitly less valuable.
Hence, Professor Kenneth Karst argues that the label "different" nec-
essarily carries a stigma. 194
Formal equality can never fully protect groups that are perceived as
different. Individuals are only entitled to be treated the same if they
share identical characteristics with those who embody the powerful
norm. To the extent that individuals are different, they are unpro-
tected. For example, the Supreme Court permitted pregnancy dis-
crimination because women are different in that they can get
pregnant. 195 In other words, the standard is presumed to be people
who cannot become pregnant-generally, although not exclusively,
men. Those who fit the norm acquire a kind of power, and the rules
are designed to meet their needs. In fact, the more similar the plain-
tiff is to the norm, the less she needs protection at all. For example,
single, childless women may be more similar to men and therefore
may face less discrimination in the job market than mothers. If, how-
ever, the plaintiff varies from the norm, she is relatively powerless.
The very factors that diminish her power-such as pregnancy-are
likely to render her "different" and therefore unprotected. Formal
equality cannot help those who are differently situated; it necessarily
prefers those who are most similar to the presumed norm.
The Court has held that children are different from adults: they are
more immature and vulnerable. 196 Because children are different,
they have different rights. Ironically, this has been interpreted to
193. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERI-
CAN LAW 22 (1990) ("Difference, after all, is a comparative term. It implies a reference: differ-
ent from whom?").
194. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 248-49 (1983).
195. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (upholding a California law excluding
pregnancy-related disabilities from the state's disability insurance plan).
196. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (holding that minors are not subject to
the death penalty because they are more susceptible to peer pressure than adults and have less
control of their surroundings); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (holding that children's
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mean that the more vulnerable have fewer rights to protect them.' 97
For example, juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial when they are
accused of a crime.' 98 Because the vulnerable are different from the
strong, formal equality is unlikely to advance their interests. Children
can never fully benefit from formal equality because they will always
be different from adults.
B. Substantively Equal: Equal Power
The chief alternative to formal equality is substantive equality. 199
Substantive equality requires individualized treatment to ensure equal
opportunity. While formal equality calls for identical treatment and
does not allow for differences, substantive equality seeks to accommo-
date differences. In order to do so, it must take steps to equalize
power. Recall the example of the blind student. In contrast to formal
equality, substantive equality would not only permit the blind student
to have a Braille exam and laptop; it would require such accommoda-
tions to assure the blind student had equal power to succeed. Thus,
while formal equality concentrates on identical treatment, substantive
equality concentrates on individualized treatment in order to equalize
power. Power is at the core. Substantive equality is a remedy for sub-
ordination, not differential treatment.
rights are different from adults' rights because children are immature, vulnerable, and subject to
parental control).
197. Although some constitutional rights have been extended to juveniles, for example, In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34, 41, 55, 57 (1967), children generally have diminished rights. See, e.g.,
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (upholding a parental notification requirement
before adolescents can have an abortion); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979) (permitting
children to be committed to mental institutions without the same procedural protections as
adults); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (denying children accused of crimes
the right to trial by jury); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (holding that "[t]he
state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults"); Moe v.
Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (denying adolescents the right to marry).
198. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
199. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 193, at 19-48 (discussing the difficulty of deciding when it is
necessary to legally acknowledge differences to overcome real discrimination and unique issues
faced by certain groups, and when it is better to treat everyone "equally" in order to avoid
perpetuating the perception of difference); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equal-
ity, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987) (describing the greater value still placed on traditionally male
activities and norms, leading to more favorable treatment of those who conform to that model);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991)
(explaining the difference between formal and substantive equality in the context of issues such
as reproduction and sexual assault); Rutherford, supra note 190, at 65-78 (explaining how socie-
tal hierarchy affects how equality is conceived in due process and equal protection analyses);
Robin West, The Meaning of Equality and the Interpretive Turn, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451, 469
(1990) ("The substantive meaning of equality, or of equal protection, is that legislators must use
law to insure that no social group, such as whites or men, wrongfully subordinates another social
group, such as blacks or women.").
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Empowerment is the primary way to achieve substantive equality.
On rare occasions, the Court has applied this approach. For example,
the Court held that Southern communities could not evade the de-
mands for equal integrated schools for African-Americans simply by
closing the public schools. 20° In theory, closing schools treated all ra-
cial groups identically. But it left African-American students where
they were before-excluded from quality education and integrated
classrooms. In that case, the Court recognized that only by empower-
ing blacks to attend integrated schools could equality be achieved. 201
While formal equality focuses on equal treatment, substantive
equality focuses on empowerment. Empowerment, however, is not a
realistic goal for children. There was really no way to make Joshua
DeShaney, a mere toddler, powerful enough to protect himself.
Hence, substantive equality is also insufficient.
C. Hedonically Equal: Equal Pain and Pleasure
Rather than focusing on identical treatment or empowerment, he-
donic equality focuses on a legal accounting of each individual's expe-
rience of pain or pleasure. The hedonic approach has been used by
groups as diverse as personal injury lawyers seeking damages for pain
and suffering and feminists who attack structural preferences for male
pleasure or female pain. Hedonic theorists criticize legal rules that
fail to account for the costs of suffering and the rewards of pleasure.
Pain and pleasure must be measured in context, because some indi-
viduals or groups feel pain or pleasure more than others. For exam-
ple, infants have not developed calloused skin, so they are much more
sensitive to heat, cold, and pain than adults. Thus, if a baby and an
adult both have scalding water spilled on them, the infant will feel
much more pain. Arguably, an infant should get more compensation
for the greater pain it suffers if it is burned. Implicit in such argu-
ments is a notion of equality. If the infant suffers more, but is treated
the same as one who suffers less, the infant has been treated un-
equally. Hedonic theory requires that the personal experiences of
pain and pleasure be valued proportionally.
Legal rules tend to misallocate the remedies for pain. The law un-
dervalues the pain and pleasure experienced in everyday relation-
ships. Accordingly, cases often characterize these settings as "private"
and not subject to demands for equal treatment. Slavery, for example,
occurred in private settings: the homes, workplaces, and churches of
200. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964).
201. Id.
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individual citizens. Slaves were not owned by the state but by individ-
ual people. They were beaten, bought, sold, separated from loved
ones, and regularly subjected to rape in private settings. Society went
to great lengths to make their suffering invisible. This entire scheme is
dependent on defining many spheres of human activity as private, sep-
arate from the polity, and hence not subject to equality demands. As
Jacobus tenBroek explains, "The equal protection of the laws is vio-
lated fully as much, perhaps even more, by private invasions made
possible through failure of government to act as by discriminatory
laws and officials. '20 2
This is precisely what the Court did in DeShaney when it claimed
that the state had no duty to protect Joshua from the actions of a
private actor. This view arises from a crabbed reading of the state
action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the
Court draws an artificial distinction between acts of commission and
acts of omission. So a police officer cannot beat a child, but he can
stand by and watch while someone else does. This distinction between
negative rights (which protect us from government action) and posi-
tive rights (which entitle us to government protection) has been
soundly criticized in the scholarly literature. 20 3
Indeed, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals that the
framers were quite concerned that private action could undermine
emancipation. They worried that new employment practices and con-
202. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 119 (rev. ed. 1965). For a similar argument
that constitutional values should be protected from private incursions, see generally Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985) and Robin West, Toward
an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 129 (1991).
Others have argued for dispensing with the requirement of state action. See, e.g., Charles L.
Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967) (arguing that discarding the state action doctrine is necessary to elimi-
nate racial discrimination); Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957) (arguing that there is state
action in enforcing any legal relationship between people, and therefore there is no real distinc-
tion between "state action" and the actions of private persons whose power to discriminate is
enforced by the state); Harold W. Horowitz & Kenneth L. Karst, The Proposition Fourteen
Cases: Justice in Search of a Justification, 14 UCLA L. REV. 37 (1966) (arguing for a broader and
more coherent understanding of state action); Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reit-
man v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 39 (approving
of the Supreme Court's decision in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), because it was a step
in the direction of recognizing substantive equal protection).
203. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271
(1990) (explaining the traditional distinction between positive and negative rights, and refuting
arguments that have been used to support such a distinction); Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty
of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the affirmative right to protection of
fundamental rights).
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tracts would simply mimic slavery under another name. Had the
framers merely wanted to prohibit state bias, the amendment could
simply have read that "No State shall discriminate . . . ." The very
choice of the word "protection" implies a state duty to protect individ-
uals from private actors. As Robin West explains, "[A]s noble or cen-
tral as the ideal of formal justice may be, the Fourteenth Amendment
does not speak of equal justice; it speaks of equal protection.' '204
VII. APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF HEDONIC EQUALITY
The history of the Equal Protection Clause demonstrates that its
purpose is to protect vulnerable populations (like former slaves) from
state actions that place them at risk. The state acts to place abused
children at risk by both interfering with private rescue and refusing
public assistance. Applying hedonic equality would require the state
to take affirmative steps to protect vulnerable individuals from private
endangerment.
A. Creating a § 1983 Action to Permit Federal
Claims Against State Agencies
Just as a § 1983 action would lie against a sheriff who refuses to
interfere in a lynching, it should lie against police officers, social agen-
cies, and other actors who willfully refuse to take steps to protect
abused children.
Federal statutes creating a § 1983 action must be very specific to
grant individuals standing to sue. Other federal statutes designed to
benefit abused and neglected children have been thwarted by the re-
luctance of courts to imply private causes of action. Consider, for ex-
ample, Suter v. Artist M. 20 5 There, Congress had funded state
programs that provided services to abused and neglected children.
The legislation sought to control the quality of the programs funded
with a series of regulations that Illinois allegedly ignored. 20 6 Children
were abandoned in the system without caseworkers for months at a
time.20 7 Furthermore, children entered the system and were never as-
signed a social worker. The Supreme Court ruled that the families
who sued had no right to enforce the federal quality regulations.
Therefore, the families had no remedy, and the only available enforce-
ment tool was for the federal government to deny the state funds for
204. West, supra note 202, at 126.
205. 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
206. Id. at 351-52.
207. Brief of Respondents, Suter, 503 U.S. 347 (No. 90-1488), 1991 WL 521632.
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its programs. Since the federal government was not actually going to
carry out that threat, the result was to leave states completely unac-
countable for the inefficiency of their child service systems. Federal
legislation is thus necessary to repair this deficit in state responsibility
left by these Supreme Court decisions.
B. States Must Create Additional Remedies Against State Actors
Who Fail to Protect Children, and They Must Authorize Certain
Private Actors to Intervene on Behalf of Abused Children
Additional state legislation is also necessary. States should author-
ize tort claims against state actors who are grossly negligent in protect-
ing children from abuse. Moreover, state agencies should discipline
employees who fail to take their duty to protect children seriously,
and legislators should create remedies enforceable against officers and
others who fail to enforce protective orders. It may be necessary for
states to create a private right for some limited class of individuals to
remove and treat children who are victims of abuse. State legislatures
can debate the scope of such a right. Perhaps medical personnel or
extended family members should be given the right to petition for
temporary or permanent custody. Perhaps even strangers should be
authorized to intervene when a situation threatens grave bodily injury
or death.
C. Changes in Government Policies and Budgetary Priorities Are
Needed to Ensure Community Accountability
In addition to legislative solutions, several policy changes are essen-
tial. States and communities should mount extensive campaigns to ed-
ucate the public to intervene, albeit politely, when they see abuse.208
Most individuals have witnessed a child being abused in a store or on
public transportation, yet few intervene. Well-meaning members of
the public are often reluctant to say anything out of fear of later retali-
ation against the child. Others may be afraid for their own safety. Yet
a show of concern from a stranger can have a powerful effect on a
child. A former student of mine, who was abused as a child, said that
she always blamed herself for the abuse and assumed it was normal
until the day a stranger in a grocery store confronted her abusive fa-
208. One way to intervene is to simply defuse the situation without condemning the actions of
the parent. One child development expert suggests that strangers should try to empathize with
the frazzled parents who are using too much force by saying something sympathetic like, "Shop-
ping at this time of night is always trying." The comment deflects attention from the child, while
trying to soothe the parent. Conversation with Sarah Patton, Prof. Early Childhood Develop-
ment, Coll. of DuPage.
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ther. The student claimed that the confrontation changed her life. It
let her know that it was wrong for her father to beat her, that others
cared, and that she should not blame herself.
Communities should also work to educate parents about the hor-
rendous effects violence has on children. Many parents were raised in
angry, abusive homes and have simply mimicked their own parents'
behaviors. Specific and thoughtfully presented education about alter-
native forms of discipline and the consequences of abuse can help
spread better parenting methods.
Most importantly, government at all levels must invest more effort
and money in treating abused children. Simply placing such children
in foster homes or giving their parents anger management classes is
not sufficient. These children's immature brains can be saved from
another generation of abuse if effective mental health systems have
the resources to devote appropriate attention to their needs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Biology and the environment engage in a complicated dance that
shapes the way children grow. As they develop, adolescents are
caught up in the steps of the dance. To change their behavior, society
must do more than merely remove them from the dance floor from
time to time.
As a community, Americans must take the responsibility to change
both the law and the culture that permits children to be brutalized.
Specifically, the following changes should be made:
1. Recognize that children have a constitutional right to be safe.
2. Acknowledge that the government has a duty to protect
children.
3. Create a § 1983 action to permit federal claims against state
agencies that are grossly negligent in protecting children.
4. Provide private parties with standing to enforce legislation de-
signed to protect children.
5. Create tort claims against state actors who are grossly negligent
in protecting children.
6. Create a right for limited classes of private individuals to inter-
vene in cases of abuse and domestic violence.
7. Require all states to provide welfare services to all children re-
gardless of age or prior history of delinquency.
New government policies must also help change the culture of abuse:
1. Invest more resources in child protection, intervention, rehabili-
tation, and parent education.
2. Mount a campaign to educate the public on the consequences of
abuse and violence.
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3. Mount a campaign to educate the public on how to intervene
effectively when they see abuse.
Neuroscience and behavioral genetics can reveal a great deal about
how individuals develop, but they cannot provide magic solutions for
social ills. Only a genuine communal commitment to improving the
lives and environments of children can save the community from the
consequences of early exposure to violence.
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